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Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms 
ROBERT LEIDER* 
District of Columbia v. Heller was a landmark, if controversial, opinion. 
Discussion has centered on the merits of its self-described originalist approach. 
Supporters praise its efforts to return to a more originalist and textualist approach 
to constitutional questions, whereas critics challenge the accuracy of Heller’s 
historical claims and criticize its departure from precedent.  
This Article challenges much of the conventional wisdom about Heller, its use of 
originalism, and its relationship to nineteenth- and twentieth-century case law. 
This Article argues that, despite much of its rhetoric, Heller actually exemplified 
popular constitutionalism—not originalism—in the way it approached the most 
important practical question at issue in the case: determining the content of the 
right to bear arms. On that question, Heller—and not United States v. Miller—is 
largely consistent with the way, throughout most of American history, that both 
state and federal courts have adjudicated cases involving the right to bear arms. In 
particular, this Article argues that the dominant approach followed by 
nineteenth-century courts was neither “originalist” nor “textualist” about the right 
to bear arms. These courts did not look to how James Madison viewed the right in 
1789 or how Americans in 1791 commonly understood the Second Amendment. 
Instead, they attempted to find compromise positions on the scope of the right to 
bear arms to accommodate a population divided between those believing in the 
right and those seeking stronger restrictions on weapons. To do this, the 
nineteenth-century courts shifted their understanding of the purpose of the right to 
bear arms over time, which, in turn, enabled them to reach conclusions about the 
content of the right that reflected the contemporaneous popular understanding of 
the right—and of the right’s limits. In this revisionist account, Miller is the case 
that represented a break with the courts’ historical approach because it arguably 
allowed access to common military weapons—an approach that did not readily 
allow courts to adjust the Second Amendment right to new circumstances as these 
military weapons became increasingly destructive. These difficulties prompted 
subsequent lower courts to adopt the “collective rights” interpretation of Miller—
an interpretation that was too rigidly restrictive, and therefore, also difficult to 
adjust to reflect popular understandings. The Article concludes that Heller reflects 
a new compromise: expanding the individual self-defense rationale while 
diminishing the Second Amendment’s military objectives. This new compromise 
recognizes an individual right to have self-defense weapons, while allowing greater 
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control over military-style weapons—which aligns with how mainstream 
Americans today view the right. Although Heller radically reshaped the Second 
Amendment right to fit the twenty-first-century popular understanding of the right, 
its methodological approach is quite consistent with how most courts have 
approached Second Amendment questions—an approach that sounds more in 
popular constitutionalism than originalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two debates are raging on the Second Amendment. First, commentators have 
dissected District of Columbia v. Heller1 from every direction to determine whether 
it is “originalist” or not—and, if it is originalist, what kind. Original public 
meaning? Subjective intent of the Framers? New originalism? Old originalism? 
The second debate concerns what standard of review will (or should) apply to 
Second Amendment claims following Heller, which only determined that the 
review would not be rational basis.2 
Like every debate on the Second Amendment, consensus on these questions 
proves elusive. With respect to the first question, Mark Tushnet accepts the 
characterization of Heller as “the most originalist opinion in recent Supreme Court 
history.”3 Randy Barnett calls Justice Scalia’s majority opinion “the finest example 
of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the 
Supreme Court.”4 Reva Siegel finds herself unable to concur in these assessments. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 628 n.27. 
 3. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 609 (2008). 
 4. Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., 
June 27, 2008, at A13. 
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For her, Heller is a product of twentieth-century social movements.5 Saul Cornell 
states that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion pitted original public meaning 
originalism against Justice Stevens’s approach to look toward the Framers’ intent.6 
The critiques of Heller pour in from liberals7 and conservatives8 alike.  
The second question is no less controversial. Commentators have called for, and 
federal courts have applied, virtually every recognizable standard of review.9 
Unlike federal courts, state courts have nearly 200 years of experience adjudicating 
the right to bear arms. But analytical study into the state cases remains in its 
nascent stages.10  
Adam Winkler, in The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, notes that state courts 
distinguish between laws that purport to “regulate” the right to bear arms and those 
laws that result in the total destruction of the right.11 With one exception,12 courts 
have upheld laws that regulate the right but have struck down laws that prohibit 
exercise of the right entirely. Identifying the “regulation/prohibition” distinction is 
important when describing how courts have adjudicated claims under the Second 
Amendment and state analogues. But the “regulation/prohibition” framework 
leaves open a more basic question: What is the content of the right to keep and bear 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Dead or Alive: 
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2008). 
 6. Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 625 (2008). 
 7. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Second 
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008). 
 8. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of 
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33 (classifying Heller as “faux originalism”). 
 9. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards 
of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. 
LAW. 1 (2009); Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the 
Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547 
(2009). See generally Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court 
To Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012) (collecting cases and 
commentary); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009). 
 10. See, e.g., CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: 
THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS (1994); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011) (arguing, incorrectly in my view, that McDonald rejected the 
near-unanimous reasonableness review of state courts for gun control laws under the Second 
Amendment); Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177 (1982); David B. Kopel, The Second 
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359; David B. Kopel & Clayton 
Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1113 (2010) (surveying analytical approaches of state courts); Michael P. 
O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and 
the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2012). 
 11. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597, 
601–02 (2006) [hereinafter Winkler, Reasonable]; see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the 
Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 717 (2007) [hereinafter Winkler, Scrutinizing]. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 107–09. 
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arms? Without the answer to this question, it is impossible to evaluate whether a 
law is a mere “regulation” or a total “prohibition.”13  
Analytically, a “right” can be divided into four components.14 There is the 
subject of the right—that is, who holds the right.15 Second, the object of the right 
consists of the persons or entities against whom the right is held. Third, we can ask, 
“Why do we have the right?”—that is, what is the purpose of the right. Finally, we 
have to define the content of the right. This Article is about how courts have shaped 
the content of the right to bear arms around contemporaneous public opinion, and 
how courts adjust their understanding of the purpose of the right when shaping and 
reshaping the content. In so doing, this Article synthesizes the originalism/popular 
constitutionalism debate with the nascent literature on state court review.  
In analyzing Second Amendment questions about the content of the right, courts 
usually have not asked what the Framers intended when they drafted the Second 
Amendment, nor have they asked what Americans in 1791 understood the Second 
Amendment to mean. Instead, courts define the content of the right to keep and 
bear arms by looking to contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. The right, 
then, gets applied against jurisdictions that have strayed too far from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. A number of contemporary cases ask not just if the right is “prohibited” entirely, but 
whether the challenged regulation “frustrates” the purposes of the right. See, e.g., City of 
Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207, 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (prohibition of firearm in a city 
park “neither frustrates nor impairs” right to bear arms); Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 
1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the ban on concealed weapons did not frustrate the 
right to bear arms because individuals could carry their weapons openly); Benjamin v. 
Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1235 (Conn. 1995) (upholding Connecticut’s assault weapons ban 
under “frustrates” standard); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989); State v. 
Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Or. 1980) (observing that courts generally ask whether “a 
regulation is valid if the aim of public safety does not frustrate the guarantees of the state 
constitution” and listing prohibitions on concealed weapons and bans on possession of 
firearms by felons as examples of permissible regulations); State ex rel. City of Princeton v. 
Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that a requirement to obtain a license to 
carry a handgun, which was only issued after proving the applicant’s need to a judicial 
officer who had discretion to issue or not issue the license, frustrated the exercise of the right 
to bear a handgun for self-defense, and so was unconstitutional); State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 
113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (invalidating prohibition of concealed weapons in a 
person’s place of business on the grounds that the restriction would frustrate the right to bear 
arms for self-defense); see also supra note 10 (collecting literature discussing the 
“frustrates” framework). I treat the “frustrates” and “total prohibition” language as roughly 
synonymous. The question is rarely whether the challenged regulation “prohibits” exercising 
the right to keep and bear arms so thoroughly that people have no right to possess or carry 
any type of arm. With the exception of felons and related classes, American laws have not 
disarmed people entirely. Instead, the question courts generally ask is whether the law at 
issue totally prohibits a core component of the right, such as the ability to possess protected 
classes of arms or, in many jurisdictions, the ability to carry a firearm in public for 
self-defense. My thanks to Michael O’Shea for alerting me to this issue and for collecting the 
cases that use the “frustrates” test. 
 14. See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 36 (2002). 
 15. In the case of the Second Amendment, the commentators generally debate whether 
the right belongs to individuals generally, to only those individuals in a “well-regulated 
militia,” or to state governments. See infra text accompanying note 344. 
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then-commonly accepted scope of the right. In other words, if a jurisdiction 
restricts the right to keep and bear arms beyond the contemporaneous popularly 
accepted limit, courts will strike the law down as a “prohibition” of the right. In 
contrast, laws within the popularly accepted mainstream are upheld as mere 
“regulations”—even if the laws are prohibitory in character (e.g., a complete ban 
on felons possessing guns16). Thus, when we ask how future courts will apply 
Heller to novel Second Amendment claims, we should ask not what the Framers 
understood the right to be, but how the contemporaneous population views the right 
to bear arms.17 
This Article begins by examining the development of this doctrine in the 
nineteenth century. Since the nineteenth century, the population, legislature, and 
courts have engaged in a dialectic on the content of the right to keep and bear arms 
under the Second Amendment and state analogues.18 Restrictions on weapons are 
almost always passed by legislatures in response to specific societal problems that 
prompt concerted calls for legislation.19 Courts, then, get forced to mediate between 
diverse social movements. In mediating these disputes, courts are very sensitive to 
popular sentiments regarding the role of weapons in society.  
While Heller employed originalism in determining the subjects of the Second 
Amendment right, Heller is best understood as a continuation of this 
nineteenth-century interpretive methodology when defining the content of the right 
to bear arms. The nineteenth century witnessed two phases in Second Amendment 
jurisprudence, one in the antebellum period and one following Reconstruction. In 
each time period, the courts refashioned the right to keep and bear arms in a way 
that respected the popular conception of the right as an individual right while 
giving legislatures adequate authority to resolve contemporaneous social problems 
involving weapons. Courts accomplish this by shifting their theory about the 
purpose of the right to bear arms over time. When courts shift their theory about 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See, e.g., People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (felon-in-
possession statute a “reasonable regulation” of the right to bear arms).  
 17. I say “novel” because courts (whether state or federal) have to contend with stare 
decisis. As I argue below, courts will retheorize the purpose (and therefore the content) of 
the right to bear arms when stare decisis becomes too much of an impediment to fashioning 
the right around contemporary public meaning. Until that happens, however, a jurisdiction’s 
jurisprudence on the right to bear arms is generally a mixture of the contemporary public 
understanding of the right and holdover rules from earlier generations’ understanding of the 
right. And even when the right gets refashioned, a few holdover rules remain, although often 
in greatly altered form (for example, the post–Civil War rule in many states allowing 
individuals to carry pistols openly in the hand for individual self-defense when the 
contemporary jurisprudence largely had stopped recognizing a general right to carry 
handguns for personal self-defense). 
 18. As I describe below, nineteenth-century courts viewed the Second Amendment and 
state analogues as codifying the same preexisting right to bear arms. The former bound the 
federal government, while the latter bound the states. Thus, state courts’ analyses did not 
change significantly even if their constitutional provisions had slightly different wording 
from the Second Amendment or from the right-to-bear-arms provisions in sister states. 
 19. I describe three examples below, including antebellum Southern concerns with 
dueling, post–Civil War difficulties with handguns, and the use of submachine guns during 
Prohibition. 
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the purpose of the right to bear arms, they are able to adjust concomitantly the 
content of the right to bear arms so that the content of the right reflects 
contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. Heller, for example, changed the right 
to be primarily about private self-defense in the home in order to justify 
prohibitions on individuals having military arms that comport with today’s 
understanding of a reasonable right to bear arms. Although Heller radically 
reshaped the Second Amendment right to fit the twenty-first-century popular 
understanding of the right, its popular constitutional project is deeply rooted in our 
nation’s historical Second Amendment jurisprudence.20 
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I describe how the antebellum state courts 
resolved challenges to early state laws regulating weapons, especially initial 
prohibitions against the carrying of concealed weapons. Although many state courts 
gave a superficial history of the right to bear arms, the content of the right took on a 
dimension that, like Heller, looked more populist than historical. Nearly every state 
court recognized a right to bear arms for personal purposes under the Second 
Amendment and state analogues. This even included states, such as Tennessee and 
North Carolina, where the state constitution did not seem to protect a right to bear 
arms for private purposes at all (e.g., the right only extended “for their common 
defence”21 or “for defence of the state”22). The broad scope of the right to bear arms 
was encapsulated in Chief Justice Taney’s comment, in Dred Scott, that free blacks 
could not be citizens for, if they were, they would have a right “to keep and carry 
arms wherever they went.”23  
Although state courts approved a very broad right to bear arms for personal 
purposes, they also came under significant pressure to recognize the power of the 
legislature to regulate the right. Southern states were enacting laws against the 
carrying of concealed weapons in order to stop dueling and other honor-related 
killings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, the first state court to hear a challenge to 
a law alleged to violate the right to bear arms, took an absolutist approach, denying 
any power of the legislature to regulate concealed weapons.24 The court saw no 
difference between a “regulation” and a “prohibition” of the right to bear arms.25 
The Kentucky court’s holding is a distinct outlier in American jurisprudence and 
was quickly repudiated by every other state court to consider the scope of the right. 
The foundation of the “regulation/prohibition” distinction came in this repudiation: 
courts gave state legislatures power to regulate weapons provided they did not 
abridge the right entirely, as defined by how the contemporaneous population then 
understood the right. And the antebellum right, consistent with popular sentiment, 
included the right to have arms in public for private self-defense. Courts permitted 
states to prohibit concealed weapons, but made it clear that prohibitions on 
unconcealed weapons would not be allowed. Some of these early cases began to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. On the role of popular opinion in shaping the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, see 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).  
 21. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26. 
 22. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XVII. 
 23. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857). 
 24. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
 25. Id. at 92. 
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restrict the “arms” that were protected by the Second Amendment and state 
analogues—generally excluding small weapons designed to be concealed—but a 
few antebellum courts went further and protected only military-type weapons. 
Courts sustained more pervasive regulation of select groups (e.g., prohibitions on 
free blacks carrying arms) only under the theory that the regulated group did not 
possess full constitutional rights.  
In Part II, I explain how post–Civil War26 courts adopted a different theory of 
the purpose of the right to bear arms in order to approve more severe regulations on 
handguns. Contemporaneous legislatures, especially in Southern states, faced two 
problems. First, while the Fourteenth Amendment made former slaves and free 
blacks full citizens of the United States, the Southern white community did not 
want black citizens to carry arms. Legislatures and courts could not rely on the 
previous justification that all blacks, including those who were free, were 
noncitizens beyond the full protection of the Bill of Rights. Second, the 
prohibitions on concealed weapons proved inadequate to accomplish 
contemporaneous crime-control objectives. There was widespread defiance of the 
prohibition, and juries largely refused to convict white violators. The crime control 
problem was exacerbated by the increasing deadliness of modern weapons, 
especially concealable revolvers, which were ubiquitous following the Civil War. 
While antebellum concealed weapon bans targeted Bowie knives, daggers, and 
similar edged weapons, Reconstruction-era laws targeted handguns. This targeting 
took several forms. First, virtually every new state and territory adopted laws on 
concealed weapons; the only states that lacked concealed weapons laws were some 
of the older Northern states. Second, many Southern states began to prohibit all 
carrying of handguns, regardless of whether the weapon was concealed. Generally, 
only travelers and peace officers were exempt. Third, a few jurisdictions—most 
notably Tennessee—enacted near-total prohibitions on the sale of handguns. 
Fourth, states began to restrict the places weapons could be carried, often banning 
weapons in courts, bars, polling places, and public gatherings.  
Courts responded to these legislative concerns by largely upholding these laws. 
The power of states to prohibit concealed weapons became completely 
entrenched—so much so that, by 1897, the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
concealed weapons to be a historically understood exception to the right to bear 
arms rather than a regulation of it.27 But state courts also redefined the right to keep 
and bear arms in order to uphold near-total prohibitions against the carrying of 
pistols. Instead of emphasizing the right to bear arms for private purposes, state 
courts viewed the right primarily in a “civic republican” lens.28 They held that the 
right to bear arms primarily existed for defense of the community, not for private 
self-defense. Accordingly, the weapons that were protected were individual 
military weapons (i.e., “ordinary military equipment”), not weapons primarily 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. I am looking primarily in the time period of 1870–1900. 
 27. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897). 
 28. On civic republicanism and the Second Amendment, see, for example, Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case 
Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994); David C. Williams, Civic 
Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
551 (1991). 
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carried for personal self-defense. Under this view, military rifles and carbines 
received the most constitutional protection, whereas handguns received almost 
none.  
In Part III, I articulate a revisionist account of why the lower federal courts 
adopted the collective rights view of the Second Amendment after United States v. 
Miller.29 My argument is that the lower federal courts’ adoption of the collective 
rights view was a failure of courts to refashion the right to keep and bear arms in 
view of changing conceptions of the right. The “collective rights view” of the 
Second Amendment—the idea that the right to keep and bear arms is contingent on 
service in an organized state militia—was first adopted by the Kansas Supreme 
Court in 1905.30 But it became the predominant view in the federal courts from 
1935 until Heller.  
Although the Supreme Court had considered Second Amendment claims several 
times before Miller, the Court always found ways to dispose of those claims on 
narrow grounds and thereby avoid any broad pronouncement on the scope of the 
Second Amendment.31 Miller squarely raised the question of the Second 
Amendment’s scope: relying on the 1905 Kansas Supreme Court case, the 
government’s primary argument was that the Second Amendment only protected a 
collective right.32 At issue was the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act, 
which regulated “gangster”-style weapons, including machine guns and sawed-off 
shotguns.33 Miller had been indicted for transporting a sawed-off shotgun. Despite 
the fact that the government squarely raised the question in Miller, the Supreme 
Court assiduously refused—again—to make any broad pronouncements concerning 
the scope of the Second Amendment. Instead, the Court, following most 
nineteenth-century courts, held that only ordinary military weapons were protected. 
While Miller cleanly disposed of a sawed-off shotgun case, it placed the lower 
federal courts in a difficult position. The military was transitioning toward 
automatic weapons, which were widely considered inappropriate for civilian use. 
But Miller seemed to entrench the nineteenth-century case law holding that “arms” 
included only “ordinary military equipment.”34 This left lower courts unable to 
adapt the Second Amendment to prevailing popular opinion regarding the scope of 
the right. Weapons considered appropriate for civilian possession, such as hunting 
rifles and handguns for individual self-defense, did not seemingly come within 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 30. See City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 244 
(1983). I note below that at least one of the opinions in State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842), 
may have held this view of the Second Amendment in the antebellum period, see infra text 
accompanying notes 190–95, but it was not a view that gained the acceptance of any court 
until Blaksley. 
 31. For example, in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), the Court held that the right 
to keep and bear arms was not infringed by a law that prohibited citizens (other than on-duty 
militia) from parading as an armed group in public. 
 32. Brief for the United States at 15, Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (No. 696). 
 33. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2012)). 
 34. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
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Miller’s scope of “ordinary military equipment.” Conversely, military-style 
weapons, now considered inappropriate for civilian possession, received the highest 
constitutional protection. Unwilling to accept this, lower federal courts widely 
adopted the “collective rights view” of the Second Amendment.35 Because the 
practical effect of the collective rights view is that no one can ever raise a 
successful Second Amendment challenge, adopting the collective rights view 
allowed the lower federal courts to withdraw from adjudicating Second 
Amendment claims and thereby removed them from the Miller conundrum. 
Heller marked a revival of the nineteenth-century project of protecting the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms while recognizing the power of the legislature 
to deal with contemporaneous social problems. The only ostensibly originalist 
portion of Heller was when the Court correctly held that the Second Amendment 
right was not exercisable solely by active-duty militiamen in the performance of 
their official duties.36 Heller’s originalism ended with defining the proper subjects 
of the right. Fleshing out the content of the right was a triumph of popular 
constitutionalism. The Court protected Heller’s handgun because “handguns are 
[currently] the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the 
home”—not because the Framers viewed handguns as constitutionally protected 
weapons.37 In contrast, the Court, in dicta, approved the constitutionality of 
complete prohibitions on weapons like the M16 rifle (which is the quintessential 
personal weapon of today’s militiamen) on an ahistorical reading of the 
common-law prohibition against carrying (not possessing) “dangerous and unusual 
weapons.”38 Moreover, the Court’s list of presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures, such as the “longstanding” prohibition on all felons from having guns 
(a prohibition that was so “longstanding” that Justice Alito, the Heller Court’s 
youngest member, was eighteen years old when it was passed), reads more like 
today’s understanding of the right to bear arms than it does the Framers’.39 But in 
codifying the contemporaneous popular understanding of the right to bear arms, the 
Supreme Court has simply continued a conversation that began in the early 
eighteen hundreds. 
I. ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 
Fashioning the right to keep and bear arms around the popular conception of the 
right began with the earliest court decisions on the right to keep and bear arms 
under the Second Amendment and state analogues. Although these decisions 
predate modern incorporation of the Bill of Rights, some state courts still applied 
the Second Amendment to state laws.40 Others treated the Second Amendment and 
state analogues as generally coextensive because the federal and state constitutional 
provisions codified the same preexisting right to bear arms.41 The only difference 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See infra Part III.C. 
 36. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008). 
 37. Id. at 629. 
 38. See id. at 627. 
 39. Id. at 626–27. 
 40. See, e.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (“[The right to bear 
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between federal and state constitutional guarantees was that the former bound the 
federal government whereas the latter bound state governments.  
These decisions are remarkable for several reasons. Very few of the cases 
engaged in any sort of “originalist” analysis: no one asked what James Madison 
thought in drafting the provision or looked to the ratifying conventions. Most cases 
focused on the English Bill of Rights—sometimes exclusively—as supplying the 
purpose for the right to bear arms, which was to resist political oppression.42 The 
American right to bear arms was then treated as a broader version of the English 
privilege since, unlike the English version, the Second Amendment neither limited 
arms according to a person’s social status nor did it contain the restriction “as 
allowed by law.”43  
Despite this political purpose, most antebellum state courts additionally 
recognized a very broad right to carry arms for private self-defense. Although these 
courts largely sustained prohibitions on concealed weapons as a permissible 
regulation of the right to bear arms, they also made clear that the right to carry 
weapons openly for private self-defense could not be infringed. This was true even 
when state courts construed state constitutional provisions that seemed to offer no 
protection for private self-defense. In an era when many men carried weapons, 
lawfully or not, the courts interpreted differently worded state constitutional rights 
to arms so they converged around popular beliefs about the scope of the right.  
Finally, despite recognizing a very broad right to keep and bear arms, these 
courts took seriously the legislature’s efforts at controlling crime with dangerous 
weapons. There was substantial popular outcry against the public carrying of 
weapons. Upholding the prohibitions on concealed weapons while striking down 
prohibitions on openly carried weapons was an attempt to mediate between a 
population torn between recognizing the right to carry weapons for private 
purposes while demanding legislative solutions to dueling and other honor-related 
killings. 
A. Antebellum State Laws 
Antebellum state laws governing dangerous weapons generally fell into six 
categories. These laws (1) increased penalties for using weapons in crimes, 
especially when dueling; (2) regulated the discharge of firearms; (3) regulated arms 
for those enrolled in the militia; (4) prohibited prisoners from possessing weapons; 
(5) prohibited individuals from carrying concealed weapons; and (6) prohibited 
slaves, free blacks, and Indians from possessing or receiving weapons without a 
license. The first four of these categories did not seem to raise any constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
arms for a lawful purpose] is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any 
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares 
that it shall not be infringed . . . .”); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 26–27 (1842) (opinion of 
Ringo, C.J.); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 157 (1840) (holding that the Second 
Amendment and Tennessee rights to bear arms have the same purpose). 
 42. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 615 (1840); Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156–
57 (giving the English history but giving virtually no American history on the adoption of 
the Second Amendment).  
 43. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156–58; see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1891, at 747 (1833). 
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concerns about violating the right to keep and bear arms. The main antebellum 
judicial battles were fought over concealed weapons bans and, to a lesser degree, 
laws against slaves and free blacks having arms. 
1. Antebellum Laws Triggering No Significant Judicial Scrutiny 
Four types of weapons regulations did not seem to raise any significant scrutiny 
under the Second Amendment or state analogues. I will quickly note these in 
passing before moving to the concealed weapons laws, which received 
considerably more judicial scrutiny. 
First, states passed laws increasing penalties for crimes when weapons were 
involved. Most commonly, states enacted comprehensive statutes designed to 
prohibit dueling.44 These laws often declared a killing during a duel to be murder—
not manslaughter—and subjected duelers to various disabilities such as prohibiting 
them from holding office.45 Some of these laws remain on the books.46 Other early 
laws also increased the penalties for non-dueling offenses (e.g., robbery) when 
armed.47 Targeting the possession or use of weapons in conjunction with criminal 
offenses generally was not thought to raise any sort of Second Amendment issue.48  
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 7, 1810, 1809–1811 Ill. Laws 25(adopting the Virginia anti-
dueling code); Act of Dec. 18, 1813, 1813 Ind. Laws 2d Sess. 442; Act of May 4, 1805, ch. 
50, § 25, 1804 La. Acts 1st Sess. 416, 434; Act of Mar. 18, 1796, ch. 600, § 56, 1795 N.J. 
Laws 2d Sitting 92, 107; Act of Nov. 5, 1816, ch. 1, 1816 N.Y. Laws 3; Act of Apr. 22, 
1794, ch. 238, § 10, 1793 Pa. Laws 546, 551;  Act of Jan. 26, 1810, ch. 10, 1809 Va. Acts 9;  
see also infra note 45. 
 45. Act of Oct. 23, 1820, § 1, 1818–1820 Ark. Acts. 110, 110 (dueling causing death 
within three months declared murder); Offenses Against the Public Peace and Tranquility, 
§ 7, 1816 Ga. Laws 178, 180 (removing from office any justice or other officer having 
knowledge of a duel and failing to arrest the participants); Act of Mar. 15, 1805, ch. 77, § 6, 
1805 Mass. Acts. Jan. Sess. 643, 644–645 (prohibiting duelers from holding office for 
twenty years); Act of Jan. 30, 1802, 1801 Miss. Laws July & Oct. Extra. Sess. 156, 170; Act 
of Feb. 20, 1809, ch. 124, § 25, 8 Ohio Laws 534, 542–43 (lifetime ban on holding office or 
being a juror, and dueler to be stripped half naked and placed on view); Act of Jan. 15, 1805, 
ch. 1, 1804 Ohio Acts 1, 10 (“forever disfranchised”). Some of the comprehensive dueling 
codes cited supra note 44 also contain prohibitions on holding office. 
 46. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-104(2) (West 2013) (making dueling a 
class 4 felony); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-303 (2004) (giving jurisdiction if person dies in state 
from a duel out of state); KY. CONST. §§ 228, 239 (requiring officers and attorneys to swear 
that they have not participated in a duel and prohibiting those who have dueled from taking 
office); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 750.319 (West 2004) (classifying dueling as first-degree 
murder); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-39-3 (West 2011) (disenfranchising duelers and prohibiting 
them from holding office).  
 47. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating New-Gate Prison, in Granby, and for Regulating 
and Governing the Same: And for the Punishment of Certain Attrocious Crimes and 
Felonies, 1790 Conn. Acts 392, 393 (May Sess.) (aggravated robbery); Act of Dec. 22, 1802, 
ch. 53, § 15, 1802 Ky. Acts 107, 115 (armed robbery); Act of Oct. 1, 1804, ch. 1, § 6, 1804 
La. Acts Ind. Territory 3, 6. (burglary while armed); Act of Mar. 15, 1805 § 5, 1805 Mass. 
Acts. Jan. Sess. at 284 (assault while armed); Act of Feb. 28, 1799, 1799 Miss. Laws 41, 46 
(aggravating penalty for burglary). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337, 346, 1829 WL 
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Second, states regulated the discharge of firearms within city limits and the 
storage of gunpowder to prevent fires.49 Many of these statutes continued a practice 
of regulating firearm discharges that existed even in colonial times.50 I have found 
no early court cases alleging any constitutional infirmities in these statutes, 
although modern incarnations of these statutes seem to be more controversial 
today.51  
Third, both the federal government and the states passed militia regulations. 
These laws required able-bodied white male citizens between certain ages, often 
eighteen to forty-five, to own muskets and to report for militia duty.52 Interestingly, 
I have not found early court cases or newspaper articles alleging that laws 
regulating weapons held by citizens qua militiamen violated the Second 
Amendment. No one seemed to recognize any libertarian right of militiamen to 
bring personal weapons into military service according to the militiamen’s 
individual discretion. The lack of any concern that militia regulations could impair 
the right to bear arms is important: proponents of the collective rights view have 
the burden to articulate what the right to bear arms is, as opposed to a militiaman’s 
duty to bear arms. Imposing fairly detailed affirmative obligations on the type of 
weapons with which citizens must report to militia duty seemed to trigger no 
constitutional concern whatever.53 
                                                                                                                 
3021 (Mich. 1829) (“[T]he grant of this privilege cannot be construed into the right in him 
who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor. No rights are intended to be granted by the 
constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose.”). I found one case where the contrary 
was argued. In Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 401–03 (1859), the Supreme Court of Texas 
held that a Texas law, which punished manslaughter as murder when committed with a 
Bowie knife, was not a prohibition on the right to bear arms. Instead, the law regulated an 
abuse of that right. Only if penalties deterred the lawful exercise of the right completely 
would there be a constitutional difficulty. 
 49. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American 
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 510–12, 515–16 (2004). 
 50. Id. at 502. 
 51. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (striking down a ban on 
shooting ranges inside city limits). 
 52. See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 49, at 508–10; Winkler, Scrutinizing, supra note 
11, at 709 n.148 (collecting examples of these laws). 
 53. That mandatory gun ownership triggered no constitutional concerns is important. A 
recent article by Joseph Blocher argues that the Second Amendment, as understood by 
Heller, grants a right not to bear arms. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear 
Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012). Blocher asserts that Heller redefined the Second 
Amendment to be about personal safety, unmooring it from its militia-related objective. 
Given that personal safety is sometimes enhanced by not having weapons present, the 
Second Amendment should be read to imply a negative right, just like the First Amendment 
recognizes a right not to speak. But as Blocher himself notes, this reading of the Second 
Amendment is completely ahistorical. See id. at 40–41 (trying to reconcile his view with the 
Militia Act of 1792). Blocher errs when he argues that the personal safety rationale of the 
Second Amendment supplants—rather than supplements—the militia objective. As I will 
describe below, antebellum state courts generally recognized a broad right to carry 
militia-type weapons for personal self-defense. Having weapons available for personal 
purposes did not alter the duty to bear arms when called for militia service. The government 
has always had the power to force people to bear arms. 
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Fourth, laws were enacted against transferring weapons to prisoners to prevent 
escapes.54 While Heller in dicta approved “longstanding” laws prohibiting felons 
and the mentally ill from possessing firearms,55 laws prohibiting prisoners from 
receiving weapons were the only “status” bans applied against citizens that I have 
discovered.56 Some of these laws went further by more broadly prohibiting 
conveying weapons into the jails to allow an escape, whether transferred to the 
prisoner or not. Like the discharge statutes, I have found no court cases that raise 
any constitutional question about banning prisoners from having weapons or 
bringing weapons into the jails. In 1842, the Arkansas Supreme Court in State v. 
Buzzard said that the practice had long gone unquestioned.57 State courts did not 
adjudicate cases involving total prohibitions on the right to bear arms in narrowly 
defined areas (e.g., polling places, bars, and courthouses) until after the Civil 
War.58 Nor have I found any contemporaneous newspaper accounts suggesting that 
laws restricting weapons to prisoners implicate the right to bear arms.  
Thus, although the antebellum right to bear arms included possessing arms for 
personal purposes, there seem to be several categories of weapons regulations that 
received virtually no scrutiny. Given the lack of discussion, it seems that these laws 
were not understood to raise any serious constitutional questions. 
2. Antebellum Laws Triggering State Court Review 
Two sets of laws did trigger state court review under the Second Amendment 
and state analogues. These were, first, prohibitions on carrying weapons in public 
and, second, laws that required licenses for free blacks and slaves. 
In 1813, states began regulating the public carrying of weapons.59 Kentucky 
passed the first prohibition of concealed weapons in 1813, and Louisiana followed 
later that year. These laws spread throughout the South and West, with Indiana, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Act of Feb. 25, 1824, ch. 282, § 11, 1824 Me. Laws 1000, 1006 (prohibiting 
conveying weapon to a prisoner or possessing weapon in a prison with a purpose to facilitate 
an escape); Act of June 21, 1811, ch. 32, § 8, 1811 Mass. Acts. May Sess. 418, 422 
(prohibiting conveying a weapon to a prisoner with the intent of facilitating escape); Act of 
June 19, 1812, § 8, 1812 N.H. Laws June Sess. 18, 21–22 (prohibiting conveying a weapon 
to a prisoner or possessing a weapon in a prison with a purpose to facilitate an escape); Act 
of Nov. 9, 1808, ch. 78, § 9, 1808 Vt. Acts & Laws 107, 112. 
 55. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 56. See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842) (opinion of Ringo, C.J.) (“Persons 
accused of crime, upon their arrest, have constantly been divested of their arms, without the 
legality of the act having ever been questioned.”); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha 
Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009).  
 57. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 21. 
 58. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 59. Tennessee, which was at the forefront of gun control throughout the eighteen 
hundreds, did have an 1801 statute authorizing justices of the peace to require sureties of any 
person who (1) violated the common-law prohibition against going armed to the terror of the 
people or (2) privately carried any “dirk, large knife, pistol, or any other dangerous weapon” 
privately to the terror of the people. Act of Nov. 13, 1801, ch. 22, § 6, 1801 Tenn. Pub. Acts 
259, 260–61. 
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Tennessee, Arkansas, Georgia, Virginia, Alabama, Florida, and Ohio adopting 
similar laws.60 
Early concealed weapons prohibitions had a fair degree of uniformity. They 
generally enumerated several weapons that were of particular concern, including 
dirks or daggers, Bowie knives, swords concealed in canes, and pistols or some 
subset of pistols (e.g., “pocket pistols”).61 Many of these laws, therefore, did not 
explicitly regulate muskets, rifles, or shotguns, though most states enacted catchall 
provisions at the end of the enumerated list that applied to other dangerous or 
deadly weapons.62 The first three concealed weapons statutes, in Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and Indiana, were punishable by a stiff fine,63 but later statutes, while 
keeping the fines, also added short jail terms—typically no more than three or six 
months.64 Only one state—Georgia—went further and prohibited openly carried 
weapons as well, a fact that would be constitutionally significant when the statute 
was challenged.65 In addition to the ban on carrying concealed weapons, Georgia 
and Tennessee passed laws that prohibited the sale of Bowie knives and most 
pistols, respectively.66 
The original concealed weapons laws had few exceptions. Some of the early 
statutes did not apply to travelers,67 and this exception still exists in a number of 
states.68 Most statutes contained no privilege for law enforcement officers.69 
                                                                                                                 
 
60. Act of Feb. 1, 1839, No. 77, 1838 Ala. Acts 67; ARK. REV. STAT. div. VIII, ch. 44 
(1838); Act of Jan. 28, 1835, ch. 860, 1835 Fla. Laws 318; Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. 
Laws 90; Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1819 Ind. Laws 39; Act of Feb. 3, 1813, ch. 89, 1812 
Ky. Acts 101; Act of Mar. 25, 1813, 1813 La. Acts 172; Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 Ohio 
Laws 56; Act of Oct. 19, 1821, ch. 13, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15; Act of Feb. 2, 1838, ch. 
101, 1838 Va. Acts 76.  
 61. See the Kentucky, Louisiana, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, Ohio, and 
Arkansas laws cited supra note 60; see also Act of Jan. 27, 1838, ch. 137, 1837–1838 Tenn. 
Pub. Acts 200 (fighting knives only). 
 62. Louisiana’s law included “deadly weapons,” Indiana’s “unlawful weapons,” 
Florida’s “all arms,” Alabama’s fighting knives and firearms, Virginia’s weapons “of like 
kind” to pistols and fighting knives, and Ohio’s encompassed all dangerous weapons. 
 63. Kentucky’s law had a minimum $100 fine. Louisiana’s law allowed fines of $20–
$50. And Indiana’s law allowed a fine of up to $100. 
 64. For example, Florida ($50–$500, one to six months’ imprisonment); Virginia ($50–
$500, one to six months’ imprisonment); Tennessee ($200–$500, three to six months’ 
imprisonment); Ohio ($200 or thirty days on first offense; second offense, up to $500 or 
three months in jail or both). See laws cited supra note 60. 
 65. Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90; see also Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 66. Act of Dec. 25, 1837 § 1, 1837 Ga. Laws at 90; Act of Jan. 27, 1838 § 1, 1837–1838 
Tenn. Pub. Acts at 200–01. 
 67. Specifically, Kentucky’s statute, Tennessee’s 1821 statute (but not its 1838 Bowie 
knife statute), and Indiana’s statute did not apply to travelers. Neither did Alabama’s 1841 
version of the statute. See Of Miscellaneous Offenses, ch. 7, § 4, 1840 Ala. Acts 148, 148–
49. 
 68. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(c)(4) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-12-105(2)(b) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-9(b) (West 2011); TEXAS PENAL CODE 
§ 46.15(b)(2) (West 2011).  
 69. Alabama’s, Kentucky’s, Indiana’s, Louisiana’s, Tennessee’s, and Virginia’s statutes 
had no law enforcement exception, for example. 
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Indeed, the first challenge to a concealed weapon ban in Alabama involved a local 
sheriff who was prosecuted for carrying his pistol concealed.70 A few statutes, 
however, did exempt peace officers, but only while in the performance of their 
official duties.71 None of the statutes privileged militiamen, even in the 
performance of their duties.72 An Alabama concealed weapon ban and an Ohio 
statute allowed juries to acquit if they thought the person had reasonable cause to 
fear an attack.73 
Laws that regulated free blacks and slaves having guns constituted a second 
category of laws that antebellum state courts scrutinized to see if they were 
compatible with the right to bear arms. These laws generally made it illegal for free 
blacks or slaves to have guns without a license. Licenses were issued for limited 
times either from the slave’s owner or the justice of the peace.74 The prohibitions 
generally extended both to public carrying and to possession in the home. The laws 
did not contain extensive guidance on issuing licenses, except to state the term of 
the license and the person authorized to issue it. 
B. Antebellum Courts and the “Regulation/Prohibition” Distinction:  
Fashioning a Broad Right for Private Self-Defense While Allowing States to 
Regulate Concealed Weapons 
The antebellum right to bear arms was fought primarily over the early concealed 
weapons statutes. Much like today’s courts, antebellum state courts found 
themselves caught between a divided population. On the one hand, the carrying of 
guns and knives was ubiquitous throughout the South and West. Many within the 
population thought that they had a right to carry weapons for personal protection. 
On the other hand, the public clamored for legislative solutions to high crime rates. 
The presence of guns and knives was widely thought to make ordinary arguments 
more deadly, as the conflicted parties resorted to weapons to solve their disputes.75  
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840). 
 71. Georgia’s statute had an early exemption. Act of Dec. 25, 1837 § 4, 1837 Ga. Laws at 
90. Law enforcement officers have been granted increasing power to carry concealed weapons 
over time, as exemptions gradually expanded to allow the carrying of weapons off-duty in the 
officer’s state or jurisdiction. Current federal law allows most current and retired law 
enforcement officers to carry concealed pistols throughout the country. 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 
926C (2012). 
 72. Maryland had a proposal to ban all carrying of weapons, excepting militiamen. See 
MISS. FREE TRADER & NATCHEZ GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 1837 (citing NAT’L INTELLIGENCER). 
 73. Of Miscellaneous Offenses § 4, 1840 Ala. Acts at 148–49; Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 
Ohio Laws 56. 
 74. Act of Feb. 7, 1827, ch. 50, § 8, 1827 Del. Laws 120, 125–26; Act of Jan. 4, 1807, ch. 
81, § 2, 1806 Md. Laws (requiring annual license issued on certificate of good conduct); Act of 
June 18, 1822, § 10, 1822 Miss. Laws 5th Sess. Adjourned 179, 181–82; Act of Mar. 30, 1799, 
1799 Miss. Laws 112 (requiring a license for both slaves and free blacks); Act of Jan. 11, 1841, 
ch. 30, 1840–1841 N.C. Laws 61; Act of May 10, 1740, No. 695, § 23, 1731–1743 S.C. Pub. 
Laws 163, 168–69; cf. Act of Dec. 20, 1800, 1800 S.C. Acts 44, 46 (generally prohibiting 
nonwhites from carrying a weapon when in militia service, but providing some exceptions). 
 75. See, e.g., FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, A JOURNEY IN THE BACK COUNTRY 414–15 
(1860). 
1602 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1587 
 
My argument in this Subpart is that the courts’ approval of the concealed 
weapon statutes was a compromise solution that incorporated the popular 
conception of the right to bear arms as well as the public’s demand for legislative 
solutions to stop people from carrying weapons. Antebellum courts mostly did not 
look to originalism or the Framing era to supply the scope of the right to bear arms. 
As Heller correctly recognized, personal self-defense did not lead to the right’s 
codification.76 Instead, after giving some discussion of the English Bill of Rights, 
antebellum state courts found a broad right to possess and carry arms for private 
self-defense, both inside and outside the home. 
1. The Popular Dimensions of the Antebellum Gun Control Struggle 
Much like today, the antebellum judiciary faced a divided populace on the role 
of weapons in society. There is a contemporary perception that the promiscuous 
carrying of weapons was socially acceptable in the eighteen hundreds in a way that 
it is not today; in actuality, nineteenth-century America struggled with the practice. 
In 1837, a grand jury in Baltimore said that “[t]he wearing of deadly weapons . . . is 
an intolerable nuisance, unnecessary in the present state of any civilized 
community, dangerous in its tendencies, prenicious [sic] in its consequences and 
destructive alike of good morals and the public peace.”77 A grand jury in 
Philadelphia reached a similar conclusion that same year. It “denounce[d] the habit 
of carrying deadly weapons as a dastardly and brutal practice” and issued a 
recommendation that the Pennsylvania General Assembly prohibit the practice.78 
The grand juries’ positions are easy to understand. Nineteenth-century 
newspapers were filled with stories about slight personal offenses escalating into 
deadly conflicts. The National Intelligencer and Baltimore American reported that 
a “resort [to deadly weapons] in individual affrays appears to be now a matter of 
almost daily occurrence, especially in the West and Southwest.”79 The newspaper 
then reported two examples.  
In the first, Robert Binford, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in 
Kentucky, went to the house of Judge James, a state senator. Binford accused 
James of saying something negative about Binford’s recent election, which James 
denied. But James was unarmed and rushed back into his house. Binford followed 
with his pistol, but he was unable to get into the house and a bystander convinced 
Binford to go home. Two days later, the two met at a local tavern. When James 
asked if Binford was there to assassinate him, Binford responded, “What I came 
for, I came for.”80 Both drew pistols and fired. James killed Binford, which a court 
ruled was justifiable. Binford’s shot hit an innocent bystander in the head, killing 
him. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). 
 77. Wearing Deadly Weapons, DAILY COM. BULL. & MO. LITERARY REG. (St. Louis), 
Apr. 10, 1837. 
 78. DAILY HERALD & GAZETTE (Cleveland), May 2, 1837. 
 79. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 29, 1837 (citing the BALT. 
AM.). 
 80. Id. (citing the LOUISVILLE ADVERTISER, Nov. 22, 1837). 
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The newspaper account of the second killing lacks the dramatic details of the 
first. It appears that a man in Mississippi got into a fight with some members of 
another family, one of whom shot and stabbed him. There was no indication of 
whether this attack was ruled murder or justifiable homicide, though from the 
sparse details given, it seems hard to imagine it was the latter.81 
One can find many other accounts of the indiscriminate use of weapons, 
especially in the South. The University of Virginia, for example, had a “small 
rebellion” in September of 1836.82 The student military company and the faculty 
were locked in a battle over whether the military company had to request faculty 
permission to drill with muskets on campus. At the end of October, after the 
military company made an application for permission, the university imposed its 
customary three conditions: the members had to wear the university uniform, 
muskets could not be discharged on the University Lawn, and muskets were only to 
be carried when performing military exercises.83 The military company refused to 
accept these conditions, claiming that it was a state military company independent 
of the university and with authority to drill.84  
With the military company’s right to drill unsettled, the faculty demanded that 
the company return its weapons to the armory.85 In response, the military company 
refused to disband and indicated that it would continue drilling until the faculty 
relented. The company backed its refusal with two hours of shooting on the 
University Lawn, which only escalated the situation. The faculty searched the 
dormitories for weapons and those involved in the shooting incident. The company, 
in turn, responded with a full-scale riot, which caused the professors to arm 
themselves in self-defense. Eventually, the sheriff, backed with a military unit, 
restored order to the university, and a grand jury was summoned.86 
The riot was celebrated annually at the University of Virginia, but in 1840, the 
celebration had tragic results. Professor Davis, who objected to celebrating the 
anniversary, attempted to break up the demonstration. While attempting to remove 
the mask of a celebrating student, the student shot and killed the professor.87 This 
senseless death caused the South Carolina Temperance Advocate, a Columbia, 
South Carolina-based newspaper, to implore nearby students to stop carrying 
weapons—which suggests that the paper thought that local students were 
frequently armed.88 
The Pennsylvania Inquirer and National Gazette also thought that southern 
students were armed. The newspaper stated, “It is charged against some of the 
medical students of the South, that a few years ago, the wearing of concealed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Id. (citing the LOUISVILLE J., Nov. 23, 1837). 
 82. 2 PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 1819–1919, 
at 302 (1920). 
 83. Id. at 303. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 303–04. 
 86. Id. at 304–06. 
 87. Id. at 309–10; see also Beware of Carrying Deadly Weapons, 2 S.C. TEMPERANCE 
ADVOC. 90, 90 (1840). 
 88. Beware of Carrying Deadly Weapons, supra note 87, at 90. 
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weapons was by no means rare among them.”89 The paper then noted that even 
members of Congress carried weapons at the Capitol.  
When contemporaneous newspapers railed against individuals carrying 
weapons, they mostly railed against the entire practice of publicly going armed 
with pistols and knives. The ire was not directed solely against weapons carried in a 
concealed manner. The National Intelligencer, for example, described the 
“murderous practice” as the carrying of a weapon, not the carrying of the weapon 
concealed.90 A Cleveland paper, five years later, agreed with that assessment.91 
Likewise, the Baltimore and Philadelphia grand juries also complained about the 
wearing of deadly weapons, rather than merely their concealment. 
When concealed weapons were singled out—which they often were—news 
articles assumed that individuals would not go armed with unconcealed weapons. 
In other words, if people stopped carrying concealed weapons, they would not be 
armed at all. Thus, in 1842, the Pennsylvania Inquirer and National Gazette 
lamented that an assault and battery had turned fatal due to the presence of a 
concealed weapon. But the article made clear that the problem was the accessibility 
of the deadly weapon, not the fact of concealment: “Had [the perpetrator] been 
without a deadly weapon, his offence, it is probable, would have amounted to 
nothing more than a mere assault and battery.”92 The article then criticized the 
“young men from the South and West—who carry deadly weapons” because, the 
paper argued, “a man who mingles in society with deadly weapons about him [may 
have murder in his heart].”93 An 1837 Missouri newspaper article likewise equated 
“this fatal habit of carrying weapon[s] clandestinely” with having a weapon “ready 
at hand.”94  
The fact that contemporaneous sentiment within many quarters opposed all 
public carrying of weapons is important in trying to determine the purpose of 
concealed weapons laws at that time. Two rationales have been offered—both of 
which have some basis in the sentiments of the time. Under one view, the purpose 
of the concealed weapons ban was an attempt to stop individuals from carrying 
handguns and knives entirely. The Louisiana Supreme Court commented in a late 
nineteenth-century case that “[t]he manifest object of the statute was to prevent the 
carrying of dangerous weapons—to stamp out a practice that has been and is 
fruitful of bloodshed, misery, and death—and yet so to prohibit the carrying as not 
to infringe the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”95 Although this decision 
dated from 1885, as the newspaper accounts above indicate, this was also an 
accurate description of the predominant antebellum sentiment.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Concealed Weapons: The Cases of Colt and Alexander., PA. INQUIRER & NAT’L 
GAZETTE (Phila.), Dec. 21, 1842. 
 90. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, supra note 79. 
 91. Carrying Deadly Weapons, CLEVELAND DAILY HERALD, Aug. 14, 1843. 
 92. Concealed Weapons: The Cases of Colt and Alexander, supra note 89. 
 93. Id. 
 94. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Aug. 7, 1837 (quoting the ST. LOUIS BULL.). 
 95. State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1885). Perhaps, though, this reflected the views 
of Louisiana in 1885 more than the antebellum period. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
adopted the second theory in State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
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The second theory was that concealing a weapon especially threatened public 
safety because one party could take the other by surprise. A lot of court cases cited 
this rationale, including some contemporaneous cases.96 The newspaper story 
describing the University of Virginia shooting both decried the practice of going 
armed generally and the practice of using a hidden weapon upon “an unsuspecting 
opponent, who is ignorant that he is contending with an armed man.”97 But the 
predominant grievance seems to be against the carrying of an accessible weapon, 
rather than the concealing of it. 
While the public’s precise view on the right to bear arms is difficult to gauge, it 
seems fairly clear that many thought the right encompassed the public carrying of 
weapons apart from militia service. Every state law enacted before 1840 (except 
Virginia’s) that prohibited concealed weapons was attacked as unconstitutional in 
state courts before the Civil War.98 The only exception, Virginia, had no state 
analogue of the Second Amendment to apply until 1971.99 Defiance of the 
concealed weapons laws, often on constitutional grounds, was widespread. The 
Kentucky governor—agreeing with the state’s highest court100 that the Kentucky 
concealed weapons statute was unconstitutional—quite openly defied the law by 
taking concealed pistols to church; the butt of one gun stuck out of his pants pocket 
during the service.101 Alabama’s constitutional challenge involved a local sheriff, 
who apparently thought he had a right to carry a concealed pistol.102 The 
then-Republic of Texas legislature delayed adopting its concealed weapons statute 
until legislators were satisfied that the act would not violate the right to bear arms 
contained within Texas’s constitution.103 And there is the fact that weapons were so 
widely carried. Although this fact does not necessarily imply that weapon carriers 
thought they had a constitutional right to do so, combined with the other evidence, 
it does suggest that the popular understanding of the right to bear arms extended 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See, e.g., Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Sutton v. 
State, 12 Fla. 135, 136 (1867); Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227–28 (1861); State v. 
Button, 37 P.3d 23, 25 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1238 
(Wyo. 1986). 
 97. Beware of Carrying Deadly Weapons, supra note 87; see also Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework 
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1522–23 (2009) (quoting and explaining 
an 1820 Richmond grand jury that inveighed against carrying weapons secretly). 
 98. State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 
1 Ga. 243 (1846); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 
Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 
(2 Hum.) 154 (1840); cf. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833) (refusing to allow 
prosecution for going armed to the terror of the people, a common-law offense that the 
Tennessee legislature tried to recognize in 1801). 
 99. Virginia’s constitutional provision was passed in 1971. See Eugene Volokh, State 
Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 215 (2006) 
(citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (right added to preexisting 1776 provision extolling the 
popular militia)). 
 100. Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90. 
 101. LOUISVILLE PUB. ADVERTISER, Sept. 10, 1825. 
 102. Reid, 1 Ala. 612. 
 103. TELEGRAPH & TEX. REG. (Hous.), Jan. 23, 1839, at 3. 
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beyond militia service. State courts, thus, adjudicated right-to-bear-arms claims 
against a backdrop of a public divided between a faction believing in the right to 
carry personal weapons publicly and another faction demanding that weapon 
carrying cease entirely because of the social externalities. 
2. The Compromise of State Courts  
State supreme courts responded to the divided public by compromising on the 
scope of the right to bear arms. Unlike the First Amendment, which did not receive 
significant judicial interpretation until the twentieth century, the Second 
Amendment and state analogues were heavily litigated in the nineteenth century. 
During the antebellum period, there were approximately two dozen cases that 
offered some guidance on the scope of the right to bear arms under the Second 
Amendment and state analogues.104  
 Most courts recognized a robust right to carry arms in public—often regardless 
of the precise way in which the state analogue of the right to bear arms was 
worded—but nevertheless recognized the state’s police power to regulate the right 
for public safety. This was the origin of the “regulation/prohibition” distinction that 
Winkler identifies.105 But the content of the right to bear arms, to which the 
regulation/prohibition distinction applied, was framed around contemporaneous 
understandings of the right to bear arms. The compromise position recognized a 
right to carry weapons in public—but not to conceal the weapons. The right to bear 
arms was then enforced against outlying jurisdictions that adopted unusually 
extreme legislation—just like how Heller and McDonald struck down unusually 
restrictive complete handgun bans.106 
The compromise position of accommodating contemporaneous understandings 
of the right to bear arms—both in terms of the right and its limitations—developed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. This number comes from a search on Westlaw using all reported cases of “bear 
arms” in state courts and excluding those cases dealing solely with military service. The 
cases found track what other researchers have discovered in compiling the early cases. See 
CRAMER, supra note 10; see also O’Shea, supra note 10, at 623–37 (analyzing the 
antebellum cases and categorizing them by the scope of the right protected). 
 105. See Winkler, Reasonable, supra note 11; Winkler, Scrutinizing, supra note 11. 
 106. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (striking down prohibition on unconcealed 
weapons); see also Reid, 1 Ala. at 615 (allowing ban on concealed weapons because persons 
could carry arms openly); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); Simpson v. State, 13 
Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833) (not allowing common-law prosecution for going armed to the 
terror of the people for fear that someone’s unease at seeing a weapon would vitiate the right 
to bear arms). Heller and McDonald, likewise, only struck down complete bans on handguns 
that affected the District of Columbia, the City of Chicago, and a few Chicago suburbs. See, 
e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (sustaining handgun ban 
of a Chicago suburb); Brief for the National Rifle Association and the NRA Civil Rights 
Defense Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 28, District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (noting that, of major cities, only the District of 
Columbia and Chicago had handgun bans and that San Francisco’s ban had been struck 
down by state courts on state preemption grounds); Robert VerBruggen, Self-Defense vs. 
Municipal Gun Bans, REASON, June 2005, at 40 (discussing Chicago suburbs). Most states 
have preemption laws that forbid municipalities from banning or regulating handguns. 
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fairly quickly. Two early state courts that took absolutist positions found their 
doctrines quickly abandoned.  
Bliss v. Commonwealth107 was the first case litigated on the right to bear arms. 
Bliss was charged with having a sword concealed in a cane and was fined $100. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed in a 2–1 decision. Kentucky defended the 
law on the grounds that a prohibition on concealed weapons merely regulated the 
manner of bearing arms and was not a complete destruction of the right.108 Over an 
unpublished dissent, the majority rejected this argument. While the court 
acknowledged that a prohibition on concealed weapons was not “an entire 
destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the 
state,” the court held that “whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that 
right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of 
the constitution.”109 And the court defined the right to bear arms as the same liberty 
to wear weapons that existed at the time of the Kentucky Constitution’s adoption.  
The Tennessee Supreme Court likewise took an absolutist position in Simpson v. 
State.110 In that case, the defendant was charged with an affray, but since he had not 
engaged in actual fighting, the court examined whether to recognize the common-
law offense of going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons to the terror of the 
people.111 Unlike Heller, which saw the common-law prohibition as an early source 
of authority to ban military-style rifles,112 the Tennessee Supreme Court declared 
that the Tennessee Constitution’s guarantee of “a right [of freemen] to keep and to 
bear arms for their common defence” precluded recognizing that common-law 
offense.113 The right to bear arms, the court stated, exists “without any qualification 
whatever as to their kind or nature.”114 Since the court defined the right to bear 
arms to mean that “the people may carry arms,” the court refused to consider the 
possibility that publicly carrying weapons could be prohibited solely because some 
people might be frightened by exercising the right.115 
Neither doctrine would last long. Kentucky’s 1849 constitutional convention 
added to its right-to-bear-arms provision that “the general assembly may pass laws 
to prevent persons from carrying concealed arms.”116 Similar constitutional 
provisions to repudiate Bliss’s doctrine would be adopted throughout the South and 
West, most of which are retained in state constitutions today.117 No court dared to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
 108. Id. at 91. 
 109. Id. at 91–92. 
 110. 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833). 
 111. Id. at 358–60; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149 (discussing 
the offense). 
 112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621 (2008). 
 113. Simpson, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) at 360 (quoting TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25. 
 117. Constitutional provisions repudiating the doctrine in Bliss would be adopted in 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. See 
Volokh, supra note 99, at 193–204 (compiling the historical state constitutional provisions). 
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strike down a prohibition only on the carrying of concealed weapons until the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court partially invalidated its concealed weapons statute in 
2003.118 In Tennessee, the dicta in Simpson was repudiated by Aymette,119 a case 
that I will discuss below.120  
Against this absolutist approach, states developed a “regulation/prohibition” 
doctrine incorporating contemporaneous notions of the right to carry arms publicly. 
State v. Reid was the first attempt by a court to flesh this out.121 As I noted above, 
Reid involved a sheriff who was charged with carrying a concealed pistol after 
being threatened and believing that his life was in danger.122 The Alabama Supreme 
Court sustained the act as a mere regulation of the right to bear arms. The court 
gave some discussion of the history of the right to bear arms, noting that the 
provision derived from the English Bill of Rights, which was designed to give the 
people the means of resisting illegal and arbitrary executive power.123  
Although the purpose of the right was to resist executive power, the court still 
accepted a very broad right to carry arms for private defense. The Alabama 
Constitution provided that a citizen had the “right to bear arms in defence of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785. Although the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court took the nearly unprecedented step of partially invalidating a 
concealed weapons statute, it limited its holding mostly to concealed weapons inside a 
person’s home or business. See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 
328 (upholding the facial validity of the concealed weapons statute). The court placed a very 
high bar before someone could assert a right to carry a concealed weapon publicly. See State 
v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶ 18, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495, 499–500. The Delaware 
Supreme Court followed Hamdan in Griffin v. State, 47 A.3d 487 (Del. 2012), at least with 
respect to the carrying of a concealed weapon in a person’s home. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals affirmed a trial court’s attempt to invalidate Ohio’s concealed weapon statute in 
2002, but the Ohio Supreme Court quickly reversed. The court reaffirmed that a prohibition 
on concealed weapons was a mere regulation of the manner of bearing arms. Klein v. Leis, 
99 Ohio St. 3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, rev’g 767 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2002). The Vermont Supreme Court, in State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903), reversed a 
person’s conviction for carrying a concealed pistol, but the statute at issue forbade all 
carrying of pistols. It is not clear how Vermont would have ruled if the act had only applied 
to concealed pistols. The Seventh Circuit invalidated Illinois’s complete prohibition on 
carrying weapons, but it is unclear whether that decision translates into a right to have a 
concealed weapon or merely some right to carry a weapon outside the home for protection. 
See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). Because California prohibits all 
carrying of pistols without a license, the Ninth Circuit has required California counties to 
issue licenses to carry concealed pistols without regard to whether applicants can show that 
they personally are in special danger of victimization. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 
1144 (9th Cir. 2014). (A petition for rehearing en banc in Peruta was under review as of the 
time of publication.) 
 119. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161–62 (1840). 
 120. See infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 121. State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833), was the first case to approve a 
concealed weapons statute. But that case was a one-sentence per curiam opinion simply 
stating, “IT was held in this case, that the statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons, except 
travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, is not unconstitutional.” 
 122. 1 Ala. 612, 612–13 (1840). 
 123. Id. at 615. 
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himself and the State.”124 The Reid court could have very easily said that “defense 
of himself” meant self-defense from illegal executive power—the same reason that 
Protestants maintained a right to have arms against the Catholic monarchs—and 
that carrying a personal weapon for private self-defense was not within the scope of 
the right, as historically understood.125 Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court 
allowed—consistent with the practice of the time—individuals to carry personal 
weapons for self-defense against “lawless aggression and violence.”126 The 
prohibition against concealed weapons merely prohibited one manner of exercising 
the right to bear arms that proved especially harmful. As long as the legislature did 
not require arms to be “render[ed] . . . wholly useless for the purpose of defence”—
that is, prohibit the carrying of them openly127—the legislature had the power to 
regulate the right.128 The court then quoted Bliss at length and explicitly rejected its 
absolutist position.129 
One might argue that Reid’s analysis of the right to bear arms is irrelevant for 
the Second Amendment. The Alabama Constitution explicitly guaranteed the right 
to bear arms “in defence of himself,” which is arguably broader than the Second 
Amendment’s mere reference to “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” 
Moreover, Alabama’s constitution lacks the militia prefatory language.  
Although antebellum courts did sometimes briefly parse the different 
constitutional language, state courts never grounded their decisions in the minor 
variations in language. In fact, their decisions were remarkably uniform on the 
scope of the right. The theory underlying this was that both the federal and the 
various state constitutions “confer[red] no new rights on the people which did not 
belong to them before.”130 Whatever their minor variations in language, both the 
state and federal right-to-bear-arms provisions codified the same preexisting right. 
The various constitutions may have used different language to express the same 
proposition—but courts treated the proposition as identical despite these variations 
in language. 
 If one looks at the judicial outcomes, the decisions are mostly consistent 
regardless of the specific wording of the constitutional provision. Nunn v. State, 
which was cited in Heller, invalidated Georgia’s prohibition on openly carried 
pistols while affirming the constitutionality of its ban on concealed weapons.131 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23. 
 125. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 126. Reid, 1 Ala. at 617. 
 127. Id. at 616; see also id. at 619 (“[W]e incline to the opinion that the Legislature cannot 
inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, because it authorizes him to bear them for the 
purposes of defending himself and the State, and it is only when carried openly, that they can be 
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(discussing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822)). 
 128. Id. at 616–17. 
 129. Id. at 617–20. 
 130. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846) (emphasis in original). 
 131. Id. at 251; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612–13 (2008) (citing 
Nunn). 
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Like the Reid court, the Nunn court restricted the legislature to regulating only 
concealed weapons. In so doing, the court relied on the Second Amendment, 
notwithstanding Barron v. Baltimore.132 In striking down the prohibition on 
unconcealed weapons, we see an example of a court curtailing the legislative 
authority to regulate the right to bear arms when a legislature strayed beyond the 
remainder of the country. 
The effect of popular sentiment can also be seen in State v. Chandler,133 a 
Louisiana case. Like Nunn, Chandler relied on the Second Amendment, this time in 
approving Louisiana’s ban on concealed weapons. The court found that weapons in 
open view “place[d] men upon an equality” and was the right secured by the 
Second Amendment.134 Six years later, in State v. Smith,135 the court determined 
that the Second Amendment applied only to those arms “such as are borne by a 
people in war, or at least carried openly.”136 The militia language in the Second 
Amendment did not limit the right to bear arms to carrying them in war; it included 
carrying them openly outside of war as well—consistent with the prevailing view 
of the time. Again, like in Reid and Nunn, the legislature could only regulate 
concealed weapons, rather than select the manner of bearing arms. 
Perhaps most remarkable was State v. Huntly,137 which arguably ignored textual 
limitations in its state constitutional provision. Huntly was an antebellum North 
Carolina Supreme Court case that, like Simpson, considered whether the state 
would recognize the common-law offense of going armed to the terror of the 
people. Huntly was indicted after openly arming himself with a gun and threatening 
to kill another man over the possession of certain slaves.138 The North Carolina 
Constitution only guaranteed the right to bear arms for “defence of the State.”139 If 
any state constitutional right were to be limited to militia service, North Carolina’s 
would qualify. Yet, the opinion does not even contain the word “militia.”  
The North Carolina Supreme Court, unlike the Tennessee court in Simpson, did 
recognize the common-law offense. As a preliminary matter, in contrast to Heller, 
the Huntly court held that all guns were “unusual weapons.”140 Although gun 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the 
states). 
 133. 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
 134. Id. at 490; cf. Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172 (2010) 
(discussing different ways in which the law protects vulnerable people from more powerful 
ones). 
 135. 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856). 
 136. Id. at 633. 
 137. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843). 
 138. Id. at 418–19. 
 139. Id. at 422 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XVII). 
 140. Id. (“It has been remarked, that a double-barrelled gun, or any other gun, cannot in 
this country come under the description of ‘unusual weapons,’ for there is scarcely a man in 
the community who does not own and occasionally use a gun of some sort. But we do not 
feel the force of this criticism. A gun is an ‘unusual weapon,’ wherewith to be armed and 
clad. No man amongst us carries it about with him, as one of his every day accoutrements—
as a part of his dress—and never we trust will the day come when any deadly weapon will be 
worn or wielded in our peace loving and law-abiding State, as an appendage of manly 
equipment.”). 
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ownership was common, the court felt that it was unusual to carry a gun at all 
times as part of one’s everyday dress.141  
Even if it was unusual, the court took great pains to explain that citizens were 
“at perfect liberty” to carry a gun “[f]or any lawful purpose—either of business or 
amusement.”142 The court held that Huntly’s conduct was punishable because his 
carrying of the gun—for the purpose of terrifying others and in such manner as 
would terrify the public—was an abuse of the right to bear arms.143 The court did 
not hold—as it could have—that carrying weapons for purposes other than 
defending the state fell outside the right to bear arms. 
When state courts approved significant limitations on the right to bear arms 
outside of the mainstream, they did so on the grounds that the person—generally a 
free black—fell outside the constitutional guarantee. The North Carolina Supreme 
Court, in State v. Newsom,144 approved a statute requiring free blacks to obtain a 
license to possess or carry a firearm. The Newsom court did make a brief attempt at 
arguing that the statute was a regulation, not a prohibition of the right. The court 
said that the statute did not “deprive the free man of color of the right to carry arms 
about his person, but subjects it to the control of the County Court, giving them the 
power to say, in the exercise of a sound discretion, who, of this class of persons, 
shall have a right to the licence, or whether any shall.”145 But the court was fairly 
transparent in holding that this statute was a “regulation” only as it applied to 
nonwhites, whose constitutional rights were less. The court repeatedly argued that 
“free people of color have been among us, as a separate and distinct class, 
requiring, from necessity, in many cases, separate and distinct legislation.”146 The 
decision left little doubt that licensing white citizens in the same manner would be 
unconstitutional. Licensing the right to bear arms might be a mere “regulation” of 
the right to bear arms in 2011,147 but it was almost certainly a “prohibition” for full 
citizens in 1844.148 Dred Scott would follow thirteen years later, saying that free 
blacks could never be full citizens, lest they have a right “to keep and carry arms 
wherever they went.”149  
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3. Antebellum Outliers 
The antebellum period had two outlier cases that did not fit neatly into 
recognizing the right to bear arms in conjunction with the contemporaneous 
understanding. The first was a Tennessee case, Aymette v. State,150 that provided 
the civic republican version of the right to bear arms that would take hold in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The second, the Arkansas case State v. 
Buzzard,151 arguably provided the first precedent for the collective rights view that 
predominated in the twentieth century. 
a. Aymette v. State 
Although chronologically, Aymette was the fifth significant case on the right to 
bear arms—after Bliss, Mitchell,152 Reid, and Simpson—intellectually, Aymette 
occupies a transitional position. Like most antebellum courts, Aymette seemingly 
accepted a general right to bear arms openly, despite the Tennessee Constitution 
only granting a “right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”153 But 
this recognition of a broad right is arguable—and almost forced—for reasons I will 
explain below. 
On the other hand, Aymette provided the intellectual foundation for the civic 
republican theory of the right to bear arms—the theory that would take hold in the 
late eighteen hundreds.154 Aymette was the primary authority on which the Supreme 
Court relied in United States v. Miller.155 Its influence over Second Amendment 
jurisprudence was so profound that, until Heller, it was the single most important 
opinion ever delivered on the right to bear arms. Although Justice Scalia unfairly 
maligned the opinion in Heller,156 the opinion is far more “originalist” than Heller 
or McDonald’s supposedly historical analysis in defining the purpose and scope of 
the right to bear arms. 
William Aymette was convicted of violating Tennessee’s 1838 law against 
carrying concealed Bowie knives. He had had an argument with another man and 
responded by later attempting to track him down at a hotel to kill him. As Aymette 
was searching for the man in various places, he occasionally drew his knife, which 
led to his concealed weapons charge. The court sentenced Aymette to a $200 fine 
and the statutory minimum three months’ imprisonment.157 
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constitution. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26 (“That the freemen of this State have a 
right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”). 
 154. O’Shea, supra note 10, at 632–34. 
 155. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
 156. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613–14 (2008). 
 157. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 154–55 (1840). 
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The opinion, written by Judge Nathan Green, Sr., began by giving a brief history 
of the purpose of the right to bear arms. The right to bear arms, he correctly 
recognized,158 had its origins in the Glorious Revolution. The opinion skips much 
of the revolutionary details about the struggles between Parliament and the Crown: 
seventeenth-century England was torn between Catholic monarchs and a 
predominantly Protestant population. When debates over control of the nation’s 
military forces reached an impasse, King Charles I sent a small contingent of a 
standing army—which did not even exist in England until the seventeenth 
century—to arrest members of Parliament. This action triggered a civil war 
between backers of Parliament and the Crown.159 
Judge Green’s opinion picked up after the Restoration. He noted that 
seventeenth-century English law only permitted subjects whose lands had a clear 
yearly value in excess of £100 or those whose social rank was above esquire to 
have guns.160 Even among this limited group, King James II—without 
parliamentary sanction—disarmed the Protestants and quartered Catholic soldiers 
among the population to enforce his rule. By disarming the Protestant population 
and turning the army against the majority of the people, King James II enforced his 
rule in derogation of Parliament and, by extension, popular legitimacy. Judge 
Green wrote: 
 The evil that was produced by disarming the people in the time of 
James II[] was that the king, by means of a standing army quartered 
among the people, was able to overawe them, and compel them to 
submit to the most arbitrary, cruel, and illegal measures. Whereas, if 
the people had retained their arms, they would have been able, by a just 
and proper resistance to those oppressive measures, either to have 
caused the king to respect their rights, or surrender (as he was 
eventually compelled to do) the government into other hands. No 
private defence was contemplated, or would have availed anything. If 
the subjects had been armed, they could have resisted the payment of 
excessive fines, or the infliction of illegal and cruel punishments. 
When, therefore, Parliament says that “subjects which are Protestants 
may have arms for their defence, suitable to their condition, as allowed 
by law,” it does not mean for private defence, but, being armed, they 
may as a body rise up to defend their just rights, and compel their rulers 
to respect the laws. This declaration of right is made in reference to the 
fact before complained of, that the people had been disarmed, and 
soldiers had been quartered among them contrary to law. The complaint 
was against the government.161 
As a matter of original interpretation, this is considerably more accurate than 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller. It comports with Madison’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Id. at 156. See generally JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE 
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994). 
 159. MALCOLM, supra note 158, at 16–23; see also id. at 58–76 (discussing the 
continuing conflicts after the Restoration). 
 160. 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 25, § 2 (1671); see also Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156. 
 161. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 157. 
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understanding of the right to bear arms in Federalist Number 46, in which Madison 
explains that an armed populace could resist government oppression.162 Justice 
Story offers a similar view.163 And it better fits with Blackstone’s quotations, which 
Heller selectively—and misleadingly—edits.164 Aymette also argues—contrary to 
Justice Stevens’s analysis in Heller165—that early state constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing citizens the right to bear arms “in defence of themselves” meant in 
defense of the citizenry at large against oppression, not individual self-defense 
against criminals.166 Under Judge Green’s view, the Second Amendment and the 
state analogues are broader than the English right, though they serve the same 
purpose.167 
The purpose of the right to keep and bear arms informs the content of that 
right.168 Because the right is about resisting oppression, Judge Green draws several 
conclusions about the right’s content. First, the right covers only those weapons 
that are “employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military 
equipment”—personal arms that citizens would carry “in their hands” to repel 
invasions of their rights.169 Weapons that are used to commit crimes or in private 
fights, such as the Bowie knife, are not constitutionally protected “arms.”  
Second, although the right to bear arms is a “great political right,” it is subject to 
legislative regulation to ensure that the right is not abused. Here, the opinion draws 
a very crucial distinction between the right to keep arms and the right to bear 
arms.170 Citizens have an unqualified right to keep constitutionally protected arms 
in their homes.171 This makes the weapons available if they are needed to provide 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961). 
 163. STORY, supra note 43, §§ 1889–1890, at 746–47; cf. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 1, 52–53 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting) (stating that the Second Amendment does not 
appear to have any “important bearing” on whether a state has concurrent power to arm the 
militia). 
 164. See infra notes 368–71 and accompanying text. 
 165. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 642–43 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 166. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 160–61. On the civic republican meaning of “in 
defence of themselves,” see generally Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves: The 
Original Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041 (2007). 
 167. Unlike the English provision, the American right to bear arms is not limited by one’s 
status in life; all citizens have the right to bear arms, regardless of their net worth. Aymette, 
21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 157–58. 
 168. This is also what United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939), was 
following when Justice McReynolds wrote that the Second Amendment must be viewed with 
a purpose toward maintaining the militia. 
 169. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158–59. 
 170. Id. This also provides powerful evidence that, unlike Michael Dorf’s argument (and 
a similar argument in Justice Stevens’s dissent), “the right to keep and bear arms” was not 
commonly understood as a unitary phrase. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
651 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment 
Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 317 (2000). 
 171. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 160 (“The citizens have the unqualified right to keep 
the weapon, it being of the character before described as being intended by this provision. 
But the right to bear arms is not of that unqualified character. [T]he citizens may bear them 
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for the common defense against oppression. When collective rights opinions cite 
Aymette as supporting their argument172—usually because the opinion says “bear 
arms” refers exclusively to war173—they miss the unrestrained notion of the right to 
keep arms in Aymette. Aymette does not limit the right to have arms only to when 
the government enrolls the person in a well-regulated militia. If this were the limit 
of the right, then the government could refuse to enroll people in the militia and the 
people would have no right to possess arms—which means that there would be no 
impediment to illegal executive power.174 
In contrast to the right to keep arms in the home, the right to bear arms in public 
is more limited, since the purpose of allowing citizens to carry weapons is to 
provide for the common defense.175 Citizens have peacetime duties when 
exercising their right to bear arms—for example, not showing up to a public 
gathering heavily armed to the terror of the people. The legislature may regulate 
abuses of the right with criminal penalties.176 
As a corollary of this second point, Judge Green argues that there is a “manifest” 
distinction between openly carried weapons and concealed weapons. When one 
bears arms for the common defense, the arms—such as rifles, muskets, and swords 
(note that pistols and knives are not included in the list)—have to be carried openly, 
as they would be in warfare. To deny the right to bear arms openly is to destroy the 
right, whereas this is not true for carrying weapons concealed.177 
But in this last point, we see the transitional nature of Aymette. Judge Green 
could have argued—as did many courts during the late eighteen hundreds178—that 
the legislature could mostly restrict the right to bear arms, while maintaining a 
broad right to keep arms in the home. Someone carrying a rifle in public on a 
random occasion likely does not bear arms with the common defense in mind. The 
rationale of Aymette would seemingly support a legislative decision completely 
                                                                                                                 
for the common defence; but it does not follow that they may be borne by an individual, 
merely to terrify the people or for purposes of private assassination.”). 
 172. E.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 613–14 (majority opinion) (noting that Aymette is cited by 
those advocating restricting the right to the militia); id. at 648 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 173. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 161. 
 174. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 596; Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 182–85 
(1871). 
 175. See, e.g., Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 
HARV. L. REV. 473 (1915). Although this article has been widely cited by federal cases 
adopting the collective rights holding, Emery actually takes the Aymette approach of a broad 
right to keep war arms and a limited right to bear them; he sees defense of the community as 
the right’s primary justification, with personal protection against criminals, at best, a 
secondary concern. See id. at 476–77. 
 176. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 159–60. 
 177. Id. at 160–61. 
 178. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475–76, 479–80 (1874) (recognizing an 
“absolute” right to keep arms but upholding prohibition on carrying weapons in many 
locations and in a concealed manner); State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 62–63 (1872) 
(upholding prohibition against carrying all pistols, except openly in the hand); State v. Duke, 
42 Tex. 455, 459 (1874) (upholding law that restricted the carrying of pistols to homes, 
places of business, when needed for public service, and in emergency defensive 
circumstances). 
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prohibiting weapons in public, except for militia duty or for individual incidents 
related to militia duty (e.g., bringing the gun home from a place of purchase or the 
person going target shooting, on his own accord, to increase his proficiency with 
the weapon).179 Nevertheless, Judge Green still sees—consistent with the 
antebellum sentiment—that “a prohibition to bear them openly would be a denial of 
the right altogether.”180 This shows the profound constraining influence that 
contemporaneous popular sentiment of the right to bear arms has over courts’ 
interpretations, even when, intellectually, judges think the right should have 
different dimensions. 
Aymette thus fills a transitional role. It provides the intellectual framework for 
the second half of the nineteenth century, when the right to bear arms in public 
would be sharply curtailed. But, like nearly all antebellum cases, Aymette also 
recognizes a general right to bear arms openly. The right to keep and bear arms, 
according to Judge Green, is the right to keep military rifles, muskets, and swords 
in the home and to bear them openly in public. 
b. State v. Buzzard 
The second major outlier is State v. Buzzard.181 Buzzard, another concealed 
weapons case, is the only antebellum case that arguably takes a view that the 
Second Amendment belongs only to the militia. The case had limited precedential 
value in the nineteenth century—after the Civil War, Arkansas (the only state to 
adopt it) abandoned the doctrine in favor of the Tennessee approach182—but it 
became the predominant federal court approach beginning in the 1930s.183  
Making matters more complicated, Buzzard has no court opinion. The 1842 
Arkansas Supreme Court had three judges, and the opinions in Buzzard were 
delivered seriatim. The full court’s holding is unclear. Two of the three judges—
Chief Justice Daniel Ringo and Justice Townsend Dickinson—argue that the right 
belongs to “the people” solely so they may perform militia-related objectives.184 
Justice Thomas J. Lacy, in dissent, argues that the right includes personal defense. 
He also accuses Justice Dickinson of holding that “it is the militia alone who 
possess this right in contradistinction from the mass of the people.”185 I think 
Justice Lacy is wrong about Justice Dickinson’s opinion, for reasons I will discuss 
momentarily.186 But if I am incorrect about this assessment, then we have a 
Bakke-style breakdown: Justice Dickinson argues that the right is limited to militia 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. See Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 178–79, which later took this approach. 
 180. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 161. 
 181. 4 Ark. 18 (1842); see also George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the Obvious: 
The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2148 (2008) (analyzing the opinions in Buzzard). 
 182. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); see 
also infra note 360 (recounting the history). 
 183. See United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935); see also infra Part III 
(recounting the post-Miller history). 
 184. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 24–25 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.); id. at 30 (opinion of Dickinson, J.).  
 185. Id. at 35 (opinion of Lacy, J., dissenting). 
 186. See infra notes 201–06 and accompanying text. 
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service; Justice Lacy would hold that it encompasses the private use of arms; and 
Chief Justice Ringo opines, like Aymette, that the right is not limited to those 
enrolled in the militia, but the right exists only for the purpose of public defense. 
Chief Justice Ringo’s opinion reads similarly to Aymette: the right to bear arms 
is designed to allow resistance to “those who should conspire to overthrow the 
established institutions of the country, or subjugate their common liberties.”187 
Much of his opinion is dedicated to refuting that the right to bear arms is 
absolute—which Chief Justice Ringo feared it would be if it were disconnected 
from its militia-related objective.188 Justice Dickinson makes a similar argument in 
his opinion.189  
Language in both majority opinions gives some support to the collective rights 
view. Chief Justice Ringo, for example, does state that the right “enable[s] the 
militia to discharge this most important trust [i.e., prevent overthrow of the 
government], so reposed in them, and for this purpose only, it is conceived the right 
to keep and bear arms was retained.”190 Justice Dickinson refers to the “power 
given the militia to keep and bear arms”191 as well as the power of the state to 
regulate weapons “when . . . not required or necessary for military purposes.”192 He 
further writes, “The militia constitutes the shield and defence for the security of a 
free State; and to maintain that freedom unimpaired, arms and the right to use them 
for that purpose are solemnly guarantied.”193 Chief Justice Ringo’s quotation, along 
with its surrounding text, provided support to the government’s brief in United 
States v. Miller, when the government cited Buzzard as one of three American 
cases holding that the right to bear arms only belongs to people serving in a 
militia.194 One person who compiled a history of state court decisions on the right 
to bear arms called it “by far the most extreme statement in opposition to an 
individual right to keep and bear arms in the period before the Civil War.”195 
Treating Buzzard as a collective rights decision overreads the opinions. Both 
majority opinions treat “militia” as synonymous with “able-bodied free white 
men”; neither suggests that the right to bear arms is limited to only those citizens 
who are currently enrolled in highly regulated, constantly drilling militia units (i.e., 
“select militia”).196 Indeed, Justice Dickinson says that the “militia” is “necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 24–25 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.). 
 188. Id. at 21–22. A similar jurisprudential concern occurred in federal courts after 
Miller. See infra text accompanying note 326. 
 189. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 30–32 (opinion of Dickinson, J.). 
 190. Id. at 25 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.). 
 191. Id. at 30 (opinion of Dickinson, J.). 
 192. Id. at 32. 
 193. Id.  
 194. See Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 16–18. The other two cases were 
City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905), and United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 
216 (S.D. Fla. 1935). The latter case was the first reported decision on the constitutionality 
of the National Firearms Act of 1934. See infra text accompanying note 294. 
 195. CRAMER, supra note 10, at 82. 
 196. See Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 27 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.) (treating the “free white men” 
provision in the right to bear arms as securing the state’s “republican institutions,” that is, the 
militia). 
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composed of the people”; unlike the collective rights view, he does not suggest that 
the “militia” includes only that subset of people whom the government chooses to 
enroll for military service.197 Moreover, Justice Dickinson’s opinion rejects the 
states’ rights theory of the Second Amendment. He writes, “It is not contended that 
the General Assembly of this State could interfere with any regulations made by 
Congress, as to the organizing, arming, or disciplining the militia, or in the manner 
in which that militia are either to keep or bear their arms.”198 
Justice Lacy, in dissent, takes a libertarian view of the right to bear arms: he 
recognizes only the power of the state to regulate the dangerous use of weapons.199 
He argues that if the right to bear arms means nothing more than the right of a state 
to arm a militia, then the right is worthless since the state has that power anyway.200 
Contrary to the majority, Justice Lacy views the militia as including only those 
citizens designated by state authority as enrolled in military service.201 As a result, 
if the majority’s view were correct, the state could deprive people of their arms by 
not enrolling them in military service. For Justice Lacy, the right to bear arms 
means the “privilege of the people to keep and to bear their private arms, for the 
necessary defence of their person, habitation, and property, or for any useful or 
innocent purpose whatever.”202 
Justice Lacy’s opinion is probably closest to the prevailing model that 
dominated other state courts.203 Even though the Arkansas Constitution guaranteed 
the right to bear arms “for the common defence,” his opinion recognized the right 
as being much broader.204 The majority, of course, disagreed, holding that the right 
to bear arms exists only for purposes of public defense. With the possible exception 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. Id. at 30 (opinion of Dickinson, J.) (emphasis added); see also Eugene Volokh, The 
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 802–04 (1998) (explaining that 
the militia has generally included the entire able-bodied political community). One might 
object that Justice Dickinson was simply referencing the popular militia of the nineteenth 
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RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW 
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 198. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 29 (opinion of Dickinson, J.). 
 199. See id. at 39–40 (opinion of Lacy, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the right be innocent of itself, 
it cannot be interdicted; but its unlawful exercise, degenerating into licentiousness, is subject 
to regulation.”). 
 200. Id. at 35–36. 
 201. See id. at 35. 
 202. Id. at 43. 
 203. But Justice Lacy would have struck down the prohibition on concealed weapons, so 
this places him closer to Bliss—and on the far end of the individual rights spectrum. 
 204. See ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21 (“That the free white men of this State shall 
have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”). 
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of Justice Dickinson’s opinion, no antebellum judicial authority supports limiting 
the right to bear arms to service in the militia. Nor does any authority suggest that 
the right is limited to the select (or volunteer) militia, even though the universal 
militia largely became extinct after the War of 1812. 
In limiting the right to keep and bear arms to the right to have individual 
weapons of war for the purpose of resisting oppression, Buzzard and Aymette cut 
strongly against the prevailing broad view of the antebellum right to bear arms. But 
this view of the right to bear arms would predominate after the Civil War, when 
courts would struggle to adapt the right to bear arms against new social pressures to 
control handgun violence. 
II. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DURING AND FOLLOWING RECONSTRUCTION 
The antebellum right to bear arms was a struggle between a divided citizenry, 
those who viewed public weapons as a nuisance and those who maintained a strong 
belief in the right to bear arms in public for individual purposes. Antebellum courts 
generally synthesized a compromise position that recognized both positions: allow 
states to prohibit only concealed weapons to control crime, while recognizing a 
broad right to bear arms openly, whether or not related to militia duty. The three 
courts that did not strike this compromise—two finding an absolute right to bear 
arms (the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Bliss and the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
Simpson) and one court limiting the right only to military purposes (the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in Buzzard)—found their doctrines overturned. 
The post–Civil War period marked a failure of the antebellum compromise. 
Handguns proliferated after the Civil War, and concealed weapons bans largely 
proved inadequate to stem crimes committed with them. Legislatures and the 
people clamored for new authority to regulate—and even prohibit—handguns. 
Moreover, legislatures faced new challenges, including minors with guns, persons 
showing up to court armed, armed persons “intimidating” voters at the polls with 
weapons,205 armed corporations breaking strikes, and the new legal recognition of 
blacks as full citizens with a right to have guns—something the Southern white 
community feared and resented.206 The scope of the popularly accepted right to 
bear arms changed. 
Faced with new pressures to allow legislatures to regulate guns more 
extensively, courts largely altered the scope of the right to bear arms. The right to 
bear arms following the Civil War was primarily the right contained in Aymette: a 
broad right to keep arms in the home, but a very limited right to have arms in 
public. Legislatures could regulate the right to carry handguns in a manner that 
made the right extremely difficult to exercise (e.g., limiting the right to military-
style revolvers carried openly in the hand). Constitutionally protected “arms” were 
only those arms constituting the “ordinary military equipment”—arms, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. Of course, many times these were Union soldiers guarding the polls and preventing 
the intimidation of blacks. 
 206. I am omitting discussion of the Black Codes, which, among other things, required 
the freedmen to obtain licenses before possessing firearms. These laws were overturned by 
Congress. See Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 
67, 71 (1991). 
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rifles, appropriate for individual citizens to use when in military service. Handguns 
received little constitutional protection after the Civil War, with the exception that a 
majority of courts recognized at least the right to have military-style revolvers. 
Courts also reconstructed the “regulation/prohibition” distinction to fit the new 
legislative framework. Total prohibitions on carrying guns in certain places would 
be “regulations”—not prohibitions—provided they were not overbroad. This 
supplanted the old theory that prohibitions on concealed weapons did not restrict 
the right to bear arms because such laws merely prescribed the manner in which 
arms were borne.  
A. Community Standards and the Legislative Framework 
Before the Civil War, gun control revolved primarily around concealed 
weapons, dueling, and honor-related killings. After the Civil War, the primary 
concern of legislatures was crime committed with handguns. Beginning in the 
1870s—and continuing at various times throughout the twentieth century—states 
began banning the sale and carrying of handguns. Tennessee and Arkansas imposed 
this through outright bans on all handguns, except army- or navy-model 
revolvers.207 Alabama, Texas, and Virginia taxed dealers or imposed transfer taxes 
on the sale of pistols.208 North Carolina imposed a property tax.209  
Although many commentators today malign these Southern laws as racist—
which they were—they also had legitimate crime-control objectives, and calls for 
them were not limited to Southern states. In 1873, a New York grand jury 
requested a ban on carrying pistols or concealed weapons.210 A few years later, 
these efforts met with some success when the New York City aldermen adopted a 
proposal to require a license to carry a pistol.211 The Philadelphia Inquirer reported 
in 1880 that carrying pistols had declined in Pennsylvania outside of 
Philadelphia.212  
Social pressures were clearly turning against carrying guns in public. In 1887, a 
Michigan man tried to defend himself against a concealed weapons charge by 
claiming that he showed the gun to persons with whom he came into contact and 
thus lacked the intent to conceal it. But he testified that he did not wear the gun 
openly, “lest people should think him a madman.”213 He pled for an acquittal, 
saying that honest citizens needed to be able to carry guns to defend themselves 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. Act of Apr. 1, 1881, No. 96, 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 191–92; Act of Mar. 14, 1879, 
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2014] OUR NON-ORIGINALIST RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1621 
 
against robbers—an older form of today’s “if you ban guns, only bad guys will 
have them” argument. The newspaper approved of his argument, noting that 
robberies were an everyday event.214 
Indeed, the population was torn between those who favored banning the 
carrying of pistols and those who believed that, if this were done, honest citizens 
would be at the mercy of criminals. In 1889, the Knoxville Journal spoke quite 
approvingly of Tennessee’s bans on carrying and selling pistols. The newspaper 
thought that the ban had reduced heat-of-passion killings and called for a complete 
prohibition of handguns.215 These calls were not limited to the South. The San Jose 
Evening News reprinted a Templeton Times article calling for people to stop 
carrying guns, unless they had a legitimate need.216  
On the other hand, many believed that they needed to carry guns for protection. 
In 1889, an Omaha news article detailed several people as examples of a “fad” to 
carry pistols for protection.217 Members of Congress “very generally carried” 
pistols in the Capitol.218 A Louisiana editorial complained that the Louisiana 
concealed pistol law was not working and that people needed to carry guns for 
protection.219 
In addition to these legitimate crime-control objectives, anti-pistol laws had 
some racist overtones. There was widespread belief that blacks used guns to 
commit crimes against whites. One paper quite bluntly stated that “[e]ven the 
stalwarts who believe in John Brown, and regard Lincoln’s emancipation 
proclamation as greater than the Sermon on the Mount, carry pistols in this city 
now to protect themselves from negro robbers and murderers.”220 An 
ex-Confederate officer was asked why he took his gun into an opera house when 
only “Democrats” would be present. He responded that he always carried his gun 
and thought that was the practice among both whites and blacks.221 
Instead of Black Codes, legislatures responded by prohibiting “vagrants” or 
“tramps” from carrying weapons.222 Commentators have noted that the ban on 
pistols—except army pistols—effectively priced black citizens out of weapons.223 
Army pistols were more expensive—out of the price range of most black 
Americans—and whites generally retained such pistols from their Civil War 
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service.224 Indeed, the effect of the weapons laws was to produce a double standard: 
white citizens were usually left alone to possess and carry guns—enforcement of 
the law against them was viewed as violating the right to bear arms for defense—
while black citizens were routinely prosecuted.225 
There is some evidence that the population also began to divide on whether the 
right to bear arms existed for individual defense or only for militia-related 
purposes. From Louisiana to New York, articles began to appear which contained 
strong statements that the right to bear arms applied to individual self-defense.226 
The New York editorial expressed disapproval of police proposals to ban gun 
carrying while exempting the police. It argued against the militia-centric view of 
the right to bear arms, saying instead that the provision was intended to prevent one 
standard for government officers who carry guns and a separate standard for normal 
citizens. 
But the modern collective rights argument also began to take hold in the 
late-1870s in some quarters. In response to armed strikebreaking, Illinois prohibited 
groups of people from parading with arms.227 While the law was undergoing court 
review, editorials supported it by arguing that the right to bear arms only belonged 
to people when they were acting in a state-sponsored “well-regulated militia,” not 
in private armed groups.228  
The Supreme Court never accepted this militia-only position, instead affirming 
the constitutionality of the act on narrower grounds in Presser v. Illinois.229 The 
Supreme Court very carefully said that the act did not affect the right of individuals 
to bear arms, but only to parade as groups with weapons.230 Indeed, the Court said 
that “all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the . . . reserve militia of the 
United States as well as of the States” and that states could not prohibit their 
citizens from keeping and bearing arms, since that would deprive the federal 
government of its power to call forth the militia.231 But the right to keep and bear 
arms, the Court held, did not include the right to band together as armed groups.232 
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Thus, post–Civil War courts were being torn in several directions. New 
legislation was strictly regulating guns. These included prohibitions on most 
handguns, minors having guns,233 carrying a gun while intoxicated, and the 
possession of guns in certain locations such as courthouses, polling places, and 
public gatherings.234 Many citizens were frustrated with gun crimes, including 
robberies and heat-of-passion killings. White Southerners did not want black 
Americans possessing guns. At the same time, many citizens wanted the right to 
carry guns for personal protection against crime. And labor unions worked to stop 
private detective agencies from banding together as armed groups to break up labor 
protests. Finally, contemporaneous opinions on the scope of the right began to split 
between those who thought the right should belong to the government-sponsored 
“well-regulated militia”—which now primarily consisted of the National Guard—
and those who retained the belief that the right included private self-defense. 
B. The Courts Respond 
In response to these competing social pressures, post–Civil War courts 
reconceptualized the purpose and scope of the right to keep and bear arms. Instead 
of placing a high emphasis on personal defense, the civic republican view 
articulated in Aymette took precedence. The only constitutionally protected 
weapons were those that had value for militia service—the “ordinary military 
equipment.” Most handguns did not qualify. Post–Civil War courts recognized a 
broad right to keep arms in the home and, in general, a very limited right to bear 
arms in public.235 I should note two caveats: First, like their antebellum 
predecessors, different courts deviate from the rules I have identified above, so one 
can find a few exceptions in the case law. Second, some of the state constitutional 
provisions enacted during the post–Civil War period gave legislatures explicit 
authority to regulate the wearing (or bearing) of weapons, instead of the narrower 
permission to regulate only concealed weapons.236  
As I articulated in Part I, Aymette had three main holdings. The first was that the 
only constitutionally protected weapons were those “usually employed in civilized 
warfare” and that constituted the “ordinary military equipment.” Second, the right 
to keep arms in the home was broader than the right to bear arms in public, the 
latter not including the right to carry a weapon concealed. Third, the right to bear 
arms was for public—not private—defense. Post–Civil War courts almost 
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unanimously adopted the first holding. With respect to the second holding, no court 
during this period found a right to carry a concealed weapon.237 But courts, again, 
wobbled on the third issue of whether they would recognize a right to bear arms in 
public for private purposes. Most of them did find a right for private purposes, but 
they further constrained the constitutional right of gun carrying to make the right to 
bear arms for private purposes basically useless. And they recognized that a 
legislature has wide latitude to ban guns completely in “sensitive locations,” 
provided that the restrictions are not overbroad. 
1. What Arms Are Protected? 
In the post–Civil War era, the Tennessee Supreme Court would take the lead. In 
Andrews v. State,238 the court reaffirmed Aymette, holding that protected arms 
included: 
Not every thing that may be useful for offense or defense; but what 
may properly be included or understood under the title of arms, taken in 
connection with the fact that the citizen is to keep them, as a citizen. 
Such, then, as are found to make up the usual arms of the citizen of the 
country, and the use of which will properly train and render him 
efficient in defense of his own liberties, as well as of the State. Under 
this head, with a knowledge of the habits of our people, and of the arms 
in the use of which a soldier should be trained, we would hold, that the 
rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and repeater, are such 
arms; and that under the Constitution the right to keep such arms, can 
not be infringed or forbidden by the Legislature.239 
The court then reversed the convictions of each defendant because the indictments 
did not specify the type of pistol. Army revolvers, the full-sized revolvers that were 
adopted by the U.S. Army as standard pistols, were constitutionally protected 
handguns, and as such, a total ban on them would be void.240 All other handguns 
could be prohibited.241 The Arkansas Supreme Court followed suit, holding that an 
1875 ban on carrying all pistols (whether openly or concealed) did not apply to 
army pistols.242 The court explicitly relied on Aymette and Andrews in reaching its 
decision. Georgia applied the term “arms” to militia weapons, such as “guns of 
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every kind, swords, bayonets, [and] horseman’s pistols” but not including “pistols, 
dirks, Bowie-knives, and those weapons of like character.”243  
West Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals, assuming that the Second 
Amendment applied to the states, listed “swords, guns, rifles, and muskets” as 
protected, but “pistols, bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and [other brawling 
weapons]” as excluded.244 This was one of the few decisions to exclude handguns 
entirely.245 
Between 1871 and 1874, the Texas courts took a broader view of permissible 
military weapons. In English v. State,246 the Texas Supreme Court held: 
The word “arms” in the connection we find it in the constitution of the 
United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the 
word is used in its military sense. The arms of the infantry soldier are 
the musket and bayonet; of cavalry and dragoons, the sabre, holster 
pistols and carbine; of the artillery, the field piece, siege gun, and 
mortar, with side arms.247 
This holding was under both state and federal constitutional guarantees. This is the 
only case I have found that protected weapons (artillery guns) that individuals 
could not physically bear, as opposed to only those ordinary personal arms of the 
infantry. 
In 1874, the Texas Supreme Court reversed course on whether solely military 
arms were protected. In State v. Duke,248 the court held that “arms” included “such 
arms as are commonly kept, according to the customs of the people, and are 
appropriate for open and manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for 
the defense of the State.”249 The court held that this included double-barreled 
shotguns, the huntsman’s rifle, and pistols not adapted for concealed carry, lest “the 
only arms which the great mass of the people of the State have, [would not be] 
under constitutional protection.”250 This is the only case to foreshadow the civilian 
common-use test announced by Justice Scalia in Heller.251 
Thus, by 1900, the almost-unanimous view of state courts was that the “arms” 
protected by the Second Amendment and state analogues were only those arms that 
citizens would employ in war. They were generally individual weapons that a 
citizen would possess and carry, such as rifles, muskets, and army pistols. Weapons 
that were not ordinarily employed by soldiers as personal weapons were not 
included. This category generally included weapons that were not sufficiently 
powerful to be of military value, such as Bowie knives and small pistols—weapons 
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that were often employed for criminal purposes and which would lead to an 
“offense against discipline” if carried by a soldier.252 By curtailing the scope of 
protected arms to only militia arms, the courts gave legislatures leeway to regulate 
handguns and knives, and to address the social externalities caused by the illegal 
use of such weapons. 
2. Scope of the Right to Keep Arms 
Not a single court, post–Civil War through 1900, held that the right to keep arms 
in the home was contingent on active service in a well-regulated militia—even 
though the National Guard system already had begun replacing the universal 
militia. This was consistent with the majority post–Civil War view that citizens 
have a right to keep arms. To the extent that Justice Dickinson’s opinion in Buzzard 
suggested it, by the time Fife v. State was decided, Arkansas had firmly abandoned 
the militia-only approach in favor of the Tennessee approach articulated by Judge 
Green in Aymette.253 No court adopted the collective rights view until 1905, when 
the Kansas Supreme Court became the first court in American history to limit the 
right to keep and bear arms to only those citizens actively participating in an 
organized militia.254 
 There are very few cases on the right to keep arms during the decades following 
the Civil War. Most banned weapons were insufficiently powerful to have military 
application, so courts simply held that the weapons at issue were not “arms.” The 
Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews fleshed out fully what the court thought were 
the incidents of the right to keep arms. These included the right to purchase arms, 
repair them and keep them in a useable state, purchase ammunition, practice 
shooting, and use arms for traditionally lawful purposes.255 In Jennings v. State,256 
the Texas Court of Appeals did not allow the forfeiture of a pistol that was illegally 
carried, saying that the forfeiture violated the defendant’s right to keep the arm.257  
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3. Right to Bear Arms 
With the increasing social pressure placed on legislatures to curtail handgun 
carrying, post–Civil War courts scrutinized legislation restricting public gun 
carrying less strictly than they did in the antebellum period. This is perhaps the 
most significant transformation of the right to bear arms from the antebellum to the 
post–Civil War period. 
Unlike the Kentucky antebellum case Bliss, no court during this period upheld a 
constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon, regardless of whether claims were 
raised under the Second Amendment or state analogues.258 Courts went so far as to 
even deny individuals a constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon in their 
own homes.259 By 1900, it was clear that the right to carry concealed weapons was 
not part of the constitutional right to bear arms.260 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated in the 1897 case Robertson v. Baldwin261 that the Bill of Rights had 
“exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally 
expressed. Thus, . . . the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not 
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons . . . .”262  
Courts began acknowledging that prohibitions on concealed weapons were 
designed to prevent all public carrying of weapons consistent with the right to bear 
arms. During the Civil War, the Georgia Supreme Court had held that the purpose 
of the concealed weapons statute was to alert people that a person was armed and to 
be avoided in a fight.263 The South Carolina Supreme Court understood the South 
Carolina statute to have a broader purpose, , asserting that the “purpose was, as far 
as may be consistent with the right of the citizen to bear arms, absolutely to 
prohibit the carrying of deadly weapons, with a view to prevent acts of violence 
and bloodshed.”264 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed.265 
Indeed, for the first time, courts began allowing legislatures generally to prohibit 
unconcealed pistols. When the Tennessee Supreme Court held in Andrews that a 
ban on carrying pistols could not be applied to all handguns,266 the Tennessee 
legislature responded by prohibiting the carrying of all handguns, except army 
pistols carried openly in the hand.267 Obviously, this made the carrying of handguns 
extremely difficult.268 Nevertheless, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the 
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law.269 A similarly restrictive law was upheld in Arkansas,270 which, like 
Tennessee’s law, was a legislative response to court holdings that there was a right 
to carry army pistols openly.271 The Texas Supreme Court allowed a law banning 
the carrying of handguns, except while traveling or when a person had reasonable 
grounds to fear attack.272 
Further, state courts upheld prohibitions on various “abuses” of the right. The 
Missouri Supreme Court approved restrictions on carrying firearms while 
intoxicated.273 Other courts sustained prohibitions on carrying firearms concealed 
with unlawful intent274 and pointing firearms at others,275 and one court held that 
the right to bear arms did not extend to escaped convicts trying to avoid arrest.276 
Moreover, courts held that complete bans on the possession of firearms in narrowly 
defined areas, such as courthouses, polling places, and public gatherings, were 
permissible regulations of the right to bear arms, not complete prohibitions on 
exercising the right.277 By the early nineteen hundreds, a few outlier states still 
afforded broad constitutional protection for individuals who carried pistols. In these 
states, courts did not allow legislatures to generally prohibit or broadly restrict the 
carrying of pistols; some decisions distinguished, for example, total prohibitions on 
carrying a pistol within an entire city from narrowly tailored restrictions on 
possessing weapons in courthouses, polling places, and public assemblies.278 
Thus, to borrow Bruce Ackerman’s term, we see intergenerational synthesis.279 
Courts held over some residue of a right to bear arms openly for private purposes. 
But post–Civil War courts severely curtailed the right in response to popular 
demand that handguns be further regulated. One need not analogize “guns as smut” 
to defend a largely homebound Second Amendment;280 the civic republican reading 
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accomplishes this. By 1900, the right to keep and bear arms was the right to keep 
military-style weapons in the home and, in very limited cases, to bear them openly 
in public. This required changing the structure of the right to bear arms by 
emphasizing almost exclusively the right’s purpose as public defense against 
oppression—and de-emphasizing individual self-defense. 
III. UNITED STATES V. MILLER:  
THE FAILURE TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE SOCIAL COMPROMISE  
United States v. Miller281 is one of the most maligned cases in constitutional 
history. Justice Scalia, in Heller, writes that the case “did not even purport to be a 
thorough examination of the Second Amendment.”282 Brian Frye, who compiled a 
detailed history of the case, asserts that both individual and collective rights 
theorists find Miller to be “an impenetrable mess.”283 Discussion of Miller often 
involves mentioning Justice McReynolds’s personal or professional failings.284 
In this Subpart, I make two claims. First, Miller is completely clear as to its 
holding. Without retracing all of Frye’s extensive analysis, I will review the parts 
of Miller that clearly establish that the Court was disposing of the case on grounds 
considered “startling” today285: sawed-off shotguns are not “ordinary military 
equipment.” Miller held, following Aymette, that only military arms were protected. 
Miller explicitly refused to rule on the scope of the right. 
 Miller’s principal difficulty is not its opacity—the decision, fairly read, is 
unambiguous; instead, Miller’s failing is that it entrenched a Second Amendment 
right that could not adapt to changing popular constitutional norms concerning the 
scope of the right to bear arms. Changing technology, along with the failure of the 
militia system, created a situation where the contemporaneous population 
considered military arms to be inappropriate for civilian possession. By recognizing 
a right to have arms that the contemporaneous society was not prepared to accept, 
the Supreme Court jammed the lower courts after Miller between recognizing a 
collective right to keep and bear arms—which is essentially no right—and 
recognizing a right considered so extreme that it was beyond the pale. Faced with 
this choice, lower federal courts chose to adopt the collective rights view, thereby 
removing themselves from deciding the scope of the Second Amendment. Thus, 
Miller was not a failure because the case was opaque or wrongly decided; it was 
neither. (Indeed, it was more originalist than Heller.) Miller failed because it left 
courts unable to fashion a right to bear arms that comported with the popular 
understanding of the right. 
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A. United States v. Miller 
In 1934, Congress adopted the second major gun control law in this country’s 
history: the National Firearms Act.286 The Act was a response to gangster-era 
violence, which Prohibition fueled.287 The Act attempted to ban gangster weapons, 
most notably the Thompson submachine gun.288 Because Congress was concerned 
that it did not have the constitutional power to ban machine gun possession—the 
New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence had not yet been developed—Congress 
imposed a tax modeled on the Harrison Narcotics Act.289 The law required an 
expensive license to manufacture, import, or deal in certain highly destructive 
weapons, most notably machine guns, short-barreled rifles and shotguns, silencers, 
and concealable weapons other than pistols and revolvers (e.g., pen guns or other 
gadget guns).290 Unlicensed individuals could only obtain these weapons if they 
underwent a fingerprint-based criminal background check and paid a $200 transfer 
or making tax—a tax steep enough to deter nearly all sales.291 
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were arrested on April 18, 1938, for possessing a 
sawed-off shotgun in interstate commerce in violation of the National Firearms 
Act.292 The district court dismissed the indictment, holding, with no analysis, that 
the Act violated the Second Amendment.293 The case came before the Supreme 
Court on direct appeal by the government.  
By the time of the appeal, the district courts had split on this issue. A district 
court in Florida had upheld the Act, declaring, “The Constitution does not grant the 
privilege to racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of the character dealt with 
in the act. It refers to the militia, a protective force of government; to the collective 
body and not individual rights.”294 Despite the “collective body and not individual 
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(Mostly) Harmless Error, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 901, 911 (2009). On the Thompson 
submachine gun and its relationship to state machine gun laws, see Marshall, supra note 56, 
at 705 n.57. 
 289. Frye, supra note 282, at 61. Congress decided in 1986 that it did have the power to 
ban machine guns. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 102, § 922(o), 
100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012). 
 290. National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. at 1236. 
 291. Frye, supra note 282, at 61. For the legal framework, see National Firearms Act, 48 
Stat. at 1236–40. Congress subsequently reduced the transfer tax on certain concealable 
weapons when they decided that some of the weapons had legitimate purposes. See Act of 
June 16, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-651, 52 Stat. 756 (establishing a $1 transfer tax); Act of June 
1, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-478, 74 Stat. 149 (raising the tax to $5). The tax remains at $5 today. 
26 U.S.C. § 5811(a) (2012). 
 292. Frye, supra note 282, at 48–49. 
 293. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Ark. 1939). 
 294. United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 219 (D. Fla. 1935). 
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rights” language, the opinion was not entirely clear about what it held. The district 
court found that the Constitution did not apply to “weapons of the character dealt 
with in the act” and then cited Workman and Hill, both of which held that 
individuals have a right to possess ordinary military arms for public defense 
purposes.295 It did not cite Blaksley, which held that the right only could be 
exercised in state-organized military units.296 Thus, it is possible that the Florida 
district court was recognizing a right to have military arms for public defense but 
not for individual self-defense. Alternatively, the court may have been recognizing 
a collective right to bear arms and just failed to cite the Kansas case. 
The government’s brief in Miller contained two arguments.297 First, the 
government argued that the right to bear arms “is not one which may be utilized for 
private purposes but only one which exists where the arms are borne in the militia 
or some other military organization provided for by law and intended for the 
protection of the state.”298 The government’s brief cited and quoted heavily from 
the three precedents that arguably gave a collective rights view: Justice Dickinson’s 
seriatim opinion in Buzzard, the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Blaksley, and 
the Florida district court opinion in Adams. 
Second, the government argued: 
 While some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the 
right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and 
property as well as the right of the people to bear them collectively, the 
cases are unanimous in holding that the term “arms” as used in 
constitutional provisions refers only to those weapons which are 
ordinarily used for military or public defense purposes and does not 
relate to those weapons which are commonly used by criminals.299 
The “while some courts” language was an understatement. The government backed 
its second argument with nearly twenty cases directly on point. As I have described 
above, it was the overwhelmingly accepted view of the right to keep and bear arms 
at the time—unlike the government’s collective rights argument, for which the 
government could muster only two court opinions and one concurrence. 
The Supreme Court clearly adopted the government’s second argument. The 
Court held: 
 In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or 
use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” 
at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. 
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 295. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. 
 296. City of Salina v. Blaskley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905). 
 297. Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 18; see also United States v. Emerson, 
270 F.3d 203, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the government’s alternative arguments); 
Frye, supra note 282, at 66 (same). 
 298. Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 15. 
 299. Id. at 18 (citations omitted). 
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the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the 
common defense. Aymette v. State of Tennessee, 2 Humph., Tenn., 
154, 158.300 
Miller’s holding is as clear as day. Justice McReynolds was explicitly following 
Aymette, which held that only those weapons that constitute the “ordinary military 
equipment” are constitutionally protected.301 The sawed-off shotgun was never 
ordinary military equipment. The whole essence of the sawed-off shotgun was that 
it was an ordinary shotgun specially adapted for concealment and criminal 
purposes, giving the user the destructive power of a shotgun and the portability of a 
handgun. Miller was following Aymette and the post–Civil War progeny that it had 
spawned: shortened weapons that have little or no military value—and were 
specially adapted for concealment and criminal purposes—fell outside the scope of 
“arms” protected by the Second Amendment. By the time Miller came down, there 
were nearly 100 years of case law holding this, albeit usually applied to pocket 
pistols rather than sawed-off shotguns.302  
                                                                                                                 
 
 300. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
 301. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840); see also Hugo L. Black, The 
Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 873 (1960) (“Although the Supreme Court has held 
this Amendment to include only arms necessary to a well-regulated militia, as so construed, 
its prohibition is absolute.”). 
 302. Nelson Lund reads the holding very literally. He observes:  
Note that the Court does not hold that short-barreled shotguns are outside the 
coverage of the Second Amendment. The Court says only that it has seen no 
evidence that these weapons have certain militia-related characteristics—which 
is no surprise given the procedural posture of the case—and that the Court 
could not take judicial notice of certain facts about the military utility of these 
weapons. After this statement, one would expect the case to be remanded to 
give the defendants an opportunity to offer the kind of evidence called for in the 
Court’s holding. 
Nelson Lund, Heller and Second Amendment Precedent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 
338 (2009) (noting also that the Court, in fact, remanded the case). 
  While Lund correctly observes the cautiousness of the holding, he reads the holding 
out of its historical context. By the time Miller had been decided, a century of cases had held 
that weapons specially adapted to concealment, and thus criminal purposes, were beyond the 
scope of the right to bear arms. This is why the Supreme Court, at the end of its opinion, 
notes that the district court’s opinion had no support in any state court decision. See Miller, 
307 U.S. at 182 (“[No state court decision] seem[s] to afford any material support for the 
challenged ruling of the court below.”). This would be an oddly sweeping condemnation if 
the district court’s only failure had been to collect enough evidence of the military usefulness 
of a sawed-off shotgun. Even if sawed-off shotguns had some military value, they have never 
been ordinary military equipment—that is, commonly issued to soldiers, like muskets and 
rifles have been. This fact—not the failure of Miller and Layton to argue in the Supreme 
Court—is likely why the Court stated, “Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this 
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the 
common defense.” Id. at 178. The remand that Lund cites was a remand for a criminal trial, 
not a remand for them to present more evidence about the military value of a sawed-off 
shotgun. 
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Indeed, Aymette clearly found that individuals have an “unqualified right” to 
keep military arms—and a more limited right to bear them—so that the people may 
resist oppression. If the Court had intended to hold that the right was collective, it 
would have cited Blaksley and argued that Miller and Layton were not active 
members of the National Guard. 
Just because the Court followed Aymette’s negative holding—that arms having 
no military value are not constitutionally protected—does not mean that the Court 
followed Aymette’s affirmative holding that all citizens have a right to keep military 
arms.303 The Court, in fact, did not adopt Aymette’s affirmative holding. This 
becomes clear when one analyzes the very end of the opinion—which, as far as I 
can tell, only Brian Frye has done.304 The Court stated: 
 Most if not all of the States have adopted provisions touching the 
right to keep and bear arms. Differences in the language employed in 
these have naturally led to somewhat variant conclusions concerning 
the scope of the right guaranteed. But none of them seem to afford any 
material support for the challenged ruling of the court below.305 
Frye concludes from this passage that “McReynolds assumed the scope of the 
Second Amendment guarantee depends upon the relevant state constitution. Or at 
the very least, the guarantees incorporated into the state constitutions illuminate the 
scope of the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment.”306 
Neither of Frye’s conclusions quite accurately explains the function of this 
passage. In the next sentence, the Court stated, “In the margin some of the more 
important opinions and comments by writers are cited.”307 Here, the Court cited a 
number of state supreme court cases, including City of Salina v. Blaksley, the 
Kansas case upholding only a collective right to bear arms in a state-organized 
militia, as well as Aymette, Duke, Fife, Workman, and People v. Brown (a Michigan 
case described below)—all of which upheld various species of an individual right. 
In this final passage, the Supreme Court acknowledged the debate in state courts 
over the subjects and content of the right to keep and bear arms.308 And it explicitly 
stated that it did not need to resolve this dispute because, whatever the scope of the 
right, it did not encompass possessing and carrying weapons specially adapted for 
criminal purposes. In the footnote, the Court cited cases holding that there was a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 303. For a contrary assumption, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 655 (1989) (classifying bazookas and rocket launchers as 
possibly protected weapons). 
 304. Frye, supra note 282, at 76. 
 305. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182. 
 306. Frye, supra note 282, at 76. 
 307. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182. 
 308. These cases differed on whether they were applying the Second Amendment or state 
analogues, but the analysis would be the same regardless. Most of these decisions had long 
held that the federal and state constitutions were codifying the same preexisting right to bear 
arms. See supra note 18. In some cases, the Second Amendment was applied directly. 
Workman, for example, assumed the Second Amendment directly applied to the states. State 
v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891). West Virginia did not adopt a state analogue to 
the Second Amendment until 1986. See Volokh, supra note 99, at 204. 
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private right to bear arms for self-defense (e.g., Brown and Duke), an individual 
right to bear arms only for public defense against oppression (e.g., Aymette, 
Workman, and Fife), and a collective right to bear arms only in a state-organized 
militia (Blaksley).309 No line of cases supported sawed-off shotguns as protected 
weapons. That is likely why the Court’s opinion was unanimous, in an otherwise 
bitterly divided Court.310 
B. Miller and the Contemporaneous Understanding of the Right:  
The Failure to Incorporate the Popular Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms 
Miller’s drawback was not its holding or rationale. Excluding weapons with 
little or no military value that were adapted for criminal purposes comported with 
Aymette and nearly all of the case law from the post–Civil War era.311 Limiting the 
Second Amendment’s protection to the ordinary personal arms of civilized warfare 
would still guarantee that the people could resist oppression—the original purpose 
of the right to bear arms.  
Miller failed as a constitutional decision because it entrenched an originalist 
version of the right to keep and bear arms that did not comport with the 
contemporaneous understanding of the right in 1939. The failure of Miller was in 
its timing. 
By 1939, the militia system had disintegrated. Indeed, the system largely died 
out following the War of 1812.312 Justice Story noticed the system was failing in 
the antebellum period.313 The Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews—an 1871 
case—noted that the militia system had “passed away in almost every State of the 
Union, and only remains to us as a memory of the past, probably never to be 
revived.”314 The Dick Act, passed in 1903, divided the militia into an organized and 
reserve component and eliminated the requirement that all white, male citizens 
have firearms.315 All able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five were (and 
currently are316) part of the militia and subject to militia duty. As a practical matter, 
however, no president or governor will call forth a member of the “reserve” or 
“unorganized” militia. And by 1939, the United States had a sufficiently stable 
political system that citizens did not feel a need to be armed to resist public 
oppression.  As a result, citizens had no ordinary use for militia-type weapons. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 309. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182 n.3. 
 310. Given that the collective rights view was in the distinct minority among courts, it 
would have been shocking if the Supreme Court reached unanimity—even without a 
concurrence—on whether the right was individual or collective. 
 311. See supra Part II. 
 312. See supra note 197. 
 313. STORY, supra note 43, § 1890, at 746–47. 
 314. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 184 (1871). 
 315. Act of Jan. 21, 1903 (Dick Act), ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775. The requirement to have arms 
only applied to whites because Congress never updated the Militia Act of 1792 after the 
Civil War. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. 
 316. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 311–312, 331–335 (2012); Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 
352 n.25 (1990). The current minimum age of militia service is seventeen. 10 U.S.C. § 311. 
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In the nineteenth century, courts could use the “military arms” formulation 
because the weapons associated with crimes and duels—Bowie knives and small 
handguns—were not sufficiently powerful to have military value. Courts could 
vindicate the full value of the right to bear arms to resist public oppression (or to 
use military arms for self-defense), while allowing states to ban weapons that had a 
high propensity to be used in criminal wrongdoing.  
This situation changed in the twentieth century: the Thompson submachine gun 
became associated with the “public enemy,” while the military was also 
transitioning to automatic weapons.317 In 1936, the military adopted the 
semiautomatic M1 rifle, which would be the last standard-issue army rifle lawful 
for general civilian possession.318 The advent of the machine gun and the 
submachine gun clearly foreshadowed that the military would issue soldiers 
automatic weapons as common military equipment. When the military adopted the 
automatic M14 in 1957, for the first time in American history the soldier’s 
“ordinary military equipment” was considered too dangerous for civilians generally 
to possess.319 Thus, in the nineteenth century, “war arms” and arms appropriate for 
“manly self-defense” were one and the same and were distinct from weapons 
having criminal application; in the twentieth century, “war arms” and “gangster 
weapons” were automatic weapons, whereas civilian guns for self-defense, hunting, 
or target shooting were not.  
Making the timing worse for the Supreme Court in Miller, only a few state court 
cases recognized the problem. As early as 1921, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
noted that modern military technology had diminished the importance of personal 
small arms, especially the pistol, in warfare.320 The court singled out poison gas, 
airplanes with bombs, and submarines as examples of weapons too powerful for 
general civilian possession. At the other end of the spectrum, it reaffirmed 
traditional prohibitions against certain knives carried as concealed weapons and 
having no military value. The court determined that the proper test was weapons 
                                                                                                                 
 
 317. See supra note 288. A brief note on the terminology in this paragraph: 
semiautomatic firearms fire only one round each time the trigger is pulled, while fully 
automatic firearms continue to fire until the trigger is released. (Both types of guns are 
“automatic” in the sense that the gun automatically ejects the spent shell and reloads a new 
round in the chamber without the need for the shooter manually to reload.) For legal 
purposes, the term “machinegun” includes any firearm with the capability to shoot more than 
one round with a single pull of the trigger. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012). 
 318. By 1936, the military had a variety of fully automatic firearms in its arsenal. 
Although these weapons were military equipment, they were not “ordinary military 
equipment” because they were not issued to most infantry soldiers as part of their general 
equipment. On the meaning of ordinary military equipment, see infra text accompanying 
notes 338–43. 
 319. For a brief description of the U.S. Army’s move to automatic weapons, see EDWARD 
CLINTON EZELL, SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD 24–26 (12th ed. 1983). Although not generally 
illegal for civilians to possess under federal law until 1986, the M14 was a “machinegun” 
subject to the strictures of the National Firearms Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012). Many 
state laws did ban machine gun possession. In contrast, the M1 rifle was only semiautomatic. 
EZELL, supra, at 16. The M1 rifle would not have fallen within any state or federal 
prohibitions then existing. 
 320. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1921). 
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“in common use, and borne by the people as such when this provision was 
adopted”—including “rifles, muskets, shotguns, swords, and pistols”—even if such 
weapons presently lacked significant military value.321 
The Michigan Supreme Court took a different approach to refashioning the right 
to bear arms around contemporaneous sentiments. In People v. Brown,322 the 
Michigan Supreme Court changed the scope of the “arms” that were 
constitutionally protected to those arms useful for individual self-defense, rather 
than arms useful for militia service. The court recognized that the militia was 
“legally existent” but “practically extinct”—and, in any event, armed by the 
state.323 The court asserted that “[s]ome arms”—almost certainly implying machine 
guns—“although they have a valid use for the protection of the state by organized 
and instructed soldiery in times of war or riot, are too dangerous to be kept in a 
settled community by individuals, and, in times of peace, find their use by bands of 
criminals and have legitimate employment only by guards and police.”324 As a 
result, the court held that the Michigan Constitution protected the “possession of 
those arms which, by the common opinion and usage of law-abiding people, are 
proper and legitimate to be kept upon private premises for the protection of person 
and property.”325 Although the Supreme Court cited People v. Brown in the Miller 
footnote, it did not address Brown’s critique of the nineteenth-century definition of 
“arms.” This was a fairly new problem, and the Supreme Court did not have the 
benefit of many new state court cases reformulating the right. Instead, the Court 
accepted the almost-unanimous view of nineteenth-century cases that the 
Constitution protects, at a minimum, common military arms. 
C. Miller and the Courts of Appeals:  
The Myth of Miller as Accepting a Collective Right  
Because Miller used the nineteenth-century definition of “arms”—that the only 
arms that were protected were militia arms—the courts of appeals became unable to 
fashion the right to keep and bear arms around the contemporaneous understanding 
of the right. No court wanted to entrench a right that seemed too 
countermajoritarian, that is, too extreme by contemporaneous standards. For the 
most part, the courts of appeals adopted the collective rights view—not because 
they necessarily thought it correct—but because they wanted to remove themselves 
from adjudicating Second Amendment questions. Given a choice between 
legitimizing the civilian possession of war arms and withdrawing from deciding 
Second Amendment claims, the courts of appeals selected to withdraw. Lower 
federal courts largely avoided defining the content of the Second Amendment right 
until Heller restored their authority to shape the right around contemporaneous 
standards of reasonableness.  
The courts of appeals noticed the problem with Miller immediately. In 1942, the 
First Circuit opined that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment test” for “arms” was 
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 325. Id. at 247. 
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not meant to be a general rule applicable to Second Amendment cases. As a general 
rule, the “ordinary military equipment” test:  
would seem to be already outdated, in spite of the fact that it was 
formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well known 
fact that in the so called ‘Commando Units’ some sort of military use 
seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon.326  
The court did not want to be left in the absurd situation of holding that Congress 
could only “regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a flintlock musket or 
a matchlock harquebus,” while having no authority over machine guns and 
antiaircraft weapons—weapons private persons would lack “any legitimate reason 
for having.”327 The court held that the Second Amendment did not apply in the case 
because the defendant was “on a frolic of his own and without any thought or 
intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia.”328 
The Sixth Circuit’s 1976 opinion in United States v. Warin329 also noticed the 
problem—though this time the court faced a defendant with a more sophisticated 
challenge. Francis Warin was charged with the possession of an unregistered 
machine gun, and as an able-bodied adult male, he was a member of the militia of 
the United States and the militia of Ohio.330 
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Cases that Miller did not intend to lay down a 
general rule. (Of course this was wrong: Miller did lay down a general rule—the 
nineteenth-century rule.) But from the Sixth Circuit’s perspective, if the “ordinary 
military equipment” test was out of date by Cases, the rule was positively nuts in a 
time of nuclear weapons.331 The Sixth Circuit had developed a new rule: the right 
to bear arms “applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to 
the individual’s right to bear arms.”332 Membership in the unorganized militia did 
not suffice; Warin would have to show that the gun was connected to the organized 
militia333—what the Framers would have called the “select militia.” But in case this 
holding was erroneous, the Sixth Circuit alternatively held that the machine gun 
law was a reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms, which was not unlimited 
at common law.334 
Both Cases and Warin became extremely influential as other federal courts cited 
them for the authority that individuals could not exercise the right to bear arms 
unless their particular conduct—not the particular weapon—would contribute to a 
well-regulated militia. These courts did not conduct significant further historical 
analysis of the scope of the right.335 They simply paired citations to Miller with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 326. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 923. 
 329. 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 330. Id. at 104–05. 
 331. Id. at 106. 
 332. Id. (quoting Stevens v. United States, 440 F.3d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)). 
 333. Id. at 106-07; see also United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 334. Warin, 530 F.2d at 107. 
 335. See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 1999); 
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citations to other courts of appeals cases holding that the person’s possession of the 
weapon had to relate to current organized militia service. These cases, thus, twisted 
Miller’s holding—that the firearm has to relate to the militia. To provide extra 
support for this bait and switch, these cases quoted the background principle stated 
in Miller that the Second Amendment must be “interpreted and applied with [the 
purpose of assuring the militia’s effectiveness].”336 A few cases, though, engaged in 
some perfunctory historical analysis to justify why the right to bear arms only 
belonged to organized militia.337 
To be fair to Justice McReynolds, Cases, Warin, and their progeny created a 
straw-man argument. One can view the phrase “ordinary military equipment” in 
two ways. First, if the weapon is ordinarily somewhere within the military arsenal, 
then it is protected. This is the reading offered by Cases and Warin when they 
object that the contemporary military has a vast array of weapons. Cases worried 
that “commando units” could make use of virtually anything, and Warin stated that 
this was more ridiculous in the nuclear age. Professor Sanford Levinson made a 
similar claim in his groundbreaking article, The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment.338 
Neither Miller nor Aymette took this extraordinarily broad view of “ordinary 
military equipment.” Almost no nineteenth-century case extended the phrase 
beyond those weapons ordinarily issued to individual soldiers as part of their 
equipment.339 Courts routinely provided examples, such as rifles, muskets, and 
army pistols. They never said that Gatling guns or heavy machine guns—which 
Hiram Maxim first invented in 1884340—were constitutionally protected. If one 
wanted further guidance on the phrase “ordinary military equipment,” he could 
look to the constitutional purposes of the militia and ask what weapons soldiers are 
ordinarily issued when enforcing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and repelling 
invasions.341 Even today, soldiers typically carry weapons like the M16 rifle, the 
M4 carbine, and the M9 pistol.342 Although submachine guns, machine guns, and 
bombs have their places somewhere in the military arsenal, they are not the 
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 339. See supra Part II. 
 340. See JOHN ELLIS, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MACHINE GUN 33–36 (1975). 
 341. Cf. Kates, supra note 30, at 259 (offering a different narrowing test). 
 342. See PortfolioFY2013, ARMY.MIL (April 2013), http://www.army.mil/factfiles
/equipment/individual/index.html. Some of the heavier weapons listed (e.g., machine guns) 
are crew serviced—not ordinary individual—weapons. 
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ordinary military equipment—commonly issued to each individual soldier to 
possess and carry, in the same way that the automatic rifle or pistol is. A fortiori, no 
military in the world ordinarily issues its soldiers nuclear bombs. Our paradigm 
mental image of the militiaman is the citizen with his musket, not a citizen with a 
private battleship or cannon. 
But the courts of appeals were not trying to engage in a careful reading of Miller 
or of the history of the Second Amendment. They were trying to extricate 
themselves from deciding Second Amendment claims. Even if the Second 
Amendment protected ordinary army rifles, by the time Second Amendment cases 
were largely being heard—after the Gun Control Act of 1968—army rifles 
consisted of weapons like the M16 assault rifle, which is (legally speaking) a 
“machinegun” under the National Firearms Act.343 Allowing the general civilian 
population to have free access to such weapons would not have comported with 
modern notions of a reasonable right to bear arms under contemporaneous 
standards. 
The collective rights view of the Second Amendment removed the federal courts 
from this quagmire. In all of the law review pages discussing the individual versus 
collective right to bear arms, to my knowledge, no one has fleshed out how a 
person could ever successfully challenge a law as violating a “collective right” to 
bear arms. I suspect that this is because such a claim is impossible. Given the 
Supreme Court precedent on the Militia Clauses, the rub of the collective rights 
view is that courts can never hold that a law violates the Second Amendment. 
Although there are a few different versions of the collective right,344 generally 
one must assert that he is a member of a well-regulated state militia. But I am not 
sure how one proves that he is in a “well-regulated militia.” The training of the 
militia is a political question, not subject to judicial scrutiny.345 And yet, when 
Warin (and many other cases) denies that technical militia membership suffices—a 
person must be in a “well-regulated militia”—this assumes that the court has some 
background notion of how much training and organization a militia must have 
before the court can take judicial notice of the fact that it is “well-regulated.” 
“Technical” militia members (i.e., members of the unorganized militia), like their 
organized counterparts, are subject to militia duty under the Constitution and 
federal law.346 The fact that they are not subject to periodic training is a legislative 
choice. But suppose that the mass of people were assembled once a year—as 
Hamilton suggested in Federalist Number 29—would this make them 
“well-regulated”?347 If not, how much training is required, and how does a court 
decide this? Deciding whether a militia is “well-regulated” presupposes the ability 
                                                                                                                 
 
 343. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2012). 
 344. See generally United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218–20 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining the different “models” and collecting scholarship). 
 345. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of 
governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.”). 
 346. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2012). 
 347. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) 
(“Little more can reasonably be aimed at with respect to the people at large than to have 
them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be 
necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.”). 
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of the courts to evaluate the amount of training and organization that the militia 
has—an evaluation that Gilligan v. Morgan declares the judiciary incompetent to 
undertake. 
And to the extent that the Second Amendment only applies to the organized 
militia, it is useless. No governmental body is going to organize and maintain a 
body of troops—especially to the degree that they are “well-regulated”—and then 
refuse to arm them.348 Instead, Congress simply will not enroll them in an 
organized militia.349  
With respect to individuals in an organized militia, even if the government 
armed them inappropriately, no court would dare interfere.350 This would require a 
court to assess what weapons a militiaman ought to be armed with, and then pass 
judgment on whether Congress or the states handled the task appropriately. 
Gilligan clearly makes this improper for courts to do. In fact, today’s National 
Guard members are prohibited by orders from possessing private firearms in the 
performance of their duties.351 I cannot imagine a court enjoining the practice and 
requiring state and federal governments to allow Guardsmen to bring their 
personally owned weapons to war. 
Nor as a “right of the state to arm the militia” does the collective rights view 
accomplish anything. A state does not have a right to have its own military force. In 
the Selective Draft Law Cases,352 the Supreme Court held that the power to raise 
and support armies was not limited by the Militia Clauses. Congress could, if it 
wanted, draft every able-bodied citizen into military service, leaving the states with 
no one in the militia.353 No federal court has ever held that the states can override 
federal military policy on the militia.354 At most, by the end of the twentieth 
century, the right to bear arms stood for the proposition that the states had 
concurrent power to arm citizens in a state-organized part-time fighting force,355 
provided that (1) Congress did not wish to conscript the people in those state forces 
into federal military service and (2) the state forces were not organized contrary to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 348. Moreover, this presupposes the conceptual possibility that one could be in a 
“well-regulated militia” while that militia lacked arms. But a militia without arms almost 
certainly would not be “well-regulated” in the Framers’ use of that phrase. 
 349. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600 (2008) (noting that Congress 
has plenary power over how to enroll in the militia). 
 350. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10. 
 351. U.S. ARMY MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ, GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 (GO-1), 
PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES FOR U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ (MNC–I) OR PRESENT WITHIN THE MNC–I AREA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) 2 (2009), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/go-
1.pdf (prohibiting private firearms in Iraq). Similar orders prohibit National Guardsmen from 
carrying private firearms at other times and locations. 
 352. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
 353. Id. at 382–83; see also J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second Amendment: Federal 
Preemption of State Militia Legislation, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 39 (2001). 
 354. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366; see also Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 
U.S. 334 (1990). 
 355. The force could not be full-time since this would violate the constitutional 
prohibition on keeping “troops” in time of peace. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; 32 
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
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otherwise-valid federal legislation on the military or militia. A subservient 
concurrent power hardly qualifies as a “right.” As the Eighth Circuit candidly 
observed in 1992, “Since the Miller decision, no federal court has found any 
individual’s possession of a military weapon to be ‘reasonably related to a well 
regulated militia.’”356 
The exploding popularity of a vacuous “collective” right to bear arms directly 
descends from Miller’s holding that only military weapons have constitutional 
protection. Before Miller, only two courts and possibly one concurring opinion had 
ever adopted the collective rights view.357 The remaining courts tailored the right to 
bear arms to be compatible with prevailing social norms on the place that weapons 
have in society. Miller left the federal courts unable to do this, so the lower federal 
courts extricated themselves from deciding Second Amendment cases. Contrary to 
what Justice Stevens stated in his Heller dissent,358 hundreds of judges were not 
relying on the holding in Miller; they were avoiding it. 
IV. HELLER: REFRAMING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS FOR A NEW GENERATION 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller was not a 
“Triumph of Originalism.”359 There is almost nothing originalist about the 
opinion’s pronouncement on the content of the right to bear arms. The Court’s 
originalism was limited to discerning the proper subjects of the right—that 
individuals, not in active military service, have a right to bear arms. The Court held 
that the right is not limited to being a member of a state-sponsored, highly 
organized militia—which, as I described above, is really no right at all. 
Instead, Heller has a direct continuity with the nineteenth-century right to bear 
arms. In the eighteen hundreds, two generations of courts refashioned the scope of 
the right to comport with popular constitutional sentiment. The right—and the 
restrictions on the right—reflected contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. As 
crime with knives and concealed weapons became ubiquitous, antebellum courts 
allowed legislatures to pass laws governing concealed weapons, while still 
protecting the right to carry arms for private self-defense. The three courts that 
failed to do this—two courts that found an absolute right, and one court that found 
no private right at all—had their doctrines overturned at the next available 
opportunity.360 In the post–Civil War period, courts allowed greater legislative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 356. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 357. See United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935); State v. Buzzard, 4 
Ark. 18, 33 (1842) (opinion of Dickinson, J.); City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 
1905). 
 358. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 638 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 359. Siegel, supra note 5, at 191 & n.5 (collecting sources celebrating Heller as an 
originalist opinion). 
 360. The three courts were the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 
Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), which held the right to be absolute; the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833), which although not holding that the right 
was absolute, had dicta to that effect; and State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842), in which two of 
the three judges held that the right did not protect arms for private defense. The Kentucky 
Constitutional Convention in 1849 overturned Bliss by amending the right-to-bear-arms 
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latitude to deal with the problems inflicted with handguns. Post–Civil War courts 
recognized the right to bear arms as consisting primarily in the right to have arms 
for defense against public oppression, although they often held that individuals 
could carry them for private self-defense, too. But private self-defense, especially 
with a handgun, was in the outer perimeter of the right to keep and bear arms: by 
1900, few types of pistols had constitutional protection, and courts were approving 
sharper limits on carrying weapons in public, even if not concealed. 
Heller likewise refashioned the right for a new generation. With military 
weapons considered inappropriate for civilian use, Heller “clarified” the Miller 
common-use test. Military rifles were declared beyond the constitutional right. The 
Court, in dicta, approved limits on felons having guns, despite the restriction 
having no historical basis. Heller held that the core of the right to keep and bear 
arms consisted of possessing handguns in the home for personal self-defense—
even though, in the nineteenth century, it was arguable whether handguns had 
constitutional protection and whether private self-defense fell within the scope of 
the right to bear arms. Heller did not rule on whether requiring a license is 
appropriate, even though antebellum courts only allowed licensing of free blacks, 
who were not full citizens. In short, Heller’s right to keep and bear arms is the 
Second Amendment right supported by a majority of Americans today. This right, 
then, was enforced against jurisdictions that adopted laws deemed unreasonable by 
contemporary standards. 
Dick Heller was a special policeman living in the District of Columbia. He was 
too old to even be a member of the unorganized militia.361 Heller attempted to 
register a .22 caliber revolver, a target-shooting gun that had no military value 
whatsoever and had little value for self-defense.362 He attempted to register the 
                                                                                                                 
provision to exclude concealed weapons. See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25 (1850) 
(“That the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be 
questioned; but the General Assembly may pass laws to prevent persons from carrying 
concealed arms.”). Aymette repudiated Simpson. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 
161 (1840). Buzzard’s overruling was a bit more complicated. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
nominally reaffirmed Buzzard in Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872), but reinterpreted 
the decision to be about the authority of the legislature to regulate the “constitutional right to 
bear arms in defense of person and property.” Four years later, Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 
458–61 (1876), explicitly held that citizens had a limited right to bear arms openly for 
private defense. 
  One might object that Aymette did not recognize a right of bearing arms for private 
self-defense, and yet, was not overturned. Although Aymette’s dicta rejects the individual 
self-defense rationale, Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 157, the court nevertheless reaffirmed a general 
right to carry arms openly, id. at 160–61. Practically, therefore, individuals still had a right to 
bear arms for individual self-defense. 
 361. Heller was sixty-six years old when the case was being decided and too old to be a 
part of the District militia. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 707 (2008) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 362. See Paul Duggan, Having Toppled D.C. Ban, Man Registers Revolver, WASH. POST, 
July 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/18
/AR2008071801212.html. The Internet site has a picture of the revolver. According to the 
article, Heller also apparently had a .45 Colt M1911 pistol, which was the military’s standard 
sidearm from 1911 until 1986. See Scott Engen, The History of the 1911 Pistol, 
BROWNING.COM (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.browning.com/library/infonews/detail.asp
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revolver, but the police denied his application because of a 1976 District of 
Columbia ordinance prohibiting new registrations of pistols.363 Moreover, D.C. law 
prohibited carrying a pistol in the home without a license to carry, which was 
almost never issued.364 
The District defended the law on three grounds. First, the District alleged that 
the right to bear arms was a collective right. Second, the District argued that since 
the law only applied to the District, the handgun ban had no relevance to protecting 
state governments from federal interference. Third, even if it were an individual 
right, complete bans on some kinds of protected arms were acceptable, provided 
other weapons were available.365 The District did allow residents to register some 
rifles and shotguns, provided that the weapons were not semiautomatic with a 
detachable magazine.366 In a poor strategic choice, the District did not argue that, 
regardless of the scope of the Second Amendment, the right did not protect 
handguns—or at least Heller’s .22 caliber revolver. Given the “originalist” 
character of the Court, the District could have marshaled significant nineteenth-
century precedent on this point. 
The Court held that the Second Amendment protects “an individual right to 
possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for 
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”367 Its 
historical support for a right of private self-defense required some creative liberties. 
After giving a fairly lengthy—and accurate—description of the right’s genesis in 
the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution, Justice Scalia then cited 
Blackstone for the proposition that the right to have arms protects “the natural right 
of resistance and self-preservation” and “the right of having and using arms for 
self-preservation and defence.”368 
Justice Scalia’s quotation of Blackstone is selective—and misleading. The full 
quotation reads that the right to have arms “is indeed a public allowance, under due 
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the 
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression.”369 Blackstone is talking about self-defense against the Crown—not 
                                                                                                                 
?id=301. But this was not part of the original Heller case because registering that would have 
required challenging D.C.’s machine gun ban, which also included virtually all modern 
semiautomatic weapons in its definition. See D.C. CODE § 22-4501(c) (2001) (including any 
weapon that could be readily restored to fire more than twelve times semiautomatically 
without reloading as a “machine gun”). 
 363. See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001), amended by Firearms Control Amendment 
Act of 2008, L. No. L17-0372, § 3(a)(10). Before this amendment, the District had also 
passed temporary legislation changing the definition. 
 364. D.C. CODE § 22-4506 (2001), repealed by Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 
2008, L. No. 17-0388, § 2(f); see Bsharah v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 996 n.12 (D.C. 
1994) (“It is common knowledge . . . that with very rare exceptions licenses to carry pistols 
have not been issued in the District of Columbia for many years and are virtually 
unobtainable.”). 
 365. Brief for Petitioners at 11, 35, 41, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). 
 366. Such weapons would violate the machine gun ban. See supra note 362. 
 367. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570; see also McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 
(2010) (describing Heller’s holding). 
 368. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144). 
 369. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144 (emphasis added). 
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self-defense against a burglar. And lest there be any doubt about the meaning, it 
becomes clear in Book Two of the Commentaries. Blackstone lists, among the 
various reasons for the game laws, “prevention of popular insurrections and 
resistance to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people: which last is a 
reason oftener meant, than avowed, by the makers of forest or game laws.”370 
Blackstone never mentions any objection to not having arms available for personal 
self-defense against criminals. The concern is with the “bulk of the people” having 
arms so they can resist illegal executive power. And this view of the right comports 
with Madison’s exposition of the value of citizens having arms in Federalist 
Number 46.371  
But Justice Scalia is not aiming for historical accuracy on the scope of the right. 
He is changing the scope of the right, to make the right to bear arms primarily 
about individual self-defense with handguns. At the time Heller came down, 73% 
of Americans believed that they had a right to own a gun, versus 20% who thought 
it belonged only to the militia.372 Another poll in 2009 by CNN asked: 
Which of the following comes closer to your interpretation of the 
Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? In addition to addressing 
the need for citizen-militias, it was intended to give individual 
Americans the right to keep and bear arms for their own defense. It was 
only intended to preserve the existence of citizen-militias, and does not 
give individual Americans the right to keep and bear arms for their own 
defense.373 
Americans answered the question by selecting “self-defense” by a 77%–21% 
majority. And Americans are strongly against banning handguns, by a nearly 
two-to-one margin.374 Interestingly, the population was more sympathetic to a 
handgun ban in the 1970s and 1980s, while the courts were adopting the collective 
rights view of the Second Amendment—so much for the Court acting as a 
countermajoritarian institution.375 
Of course, although Americans do support the right to bear arms in principle, 
they are split on whether Congress should adopt greater gun controls. In 2007, 
two-thirds of Americans thought that handgun laws should be made stricter.376 
About half of Americans in 2009 supported bans on so-called assault weapons, 
which was down from 75% two decades earlier—but still much higher than the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 370. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *412. 
 371. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 372. Joan Biskupic, Do You Have a Legal Right to Own a Gun?, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-02-26-guns-cover_N.htm. 
 373. CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, May 14–17, 2009, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm. 
 374. This and the following statistics come from a CBS News/New York Times Poll 
Report. Guns and Violence, CBS News/N.Y. Times Poll (Apr. 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/aprbhandguns.pdf. 
 375. Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-Low 26% in U.S. Favor Handgun Ban, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150341/record-low-favor-handgun-ban.aspx (graphing 
support over the last fifty years). 
 376. Guns and Violence, supra note 374, at 1. 
2014] OUR NON-ORIGINALIST RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1645 
 
proportion of the population that supports banning handguns.377 Convicted felons 
have the lowest popular support for their right to keep arms: a 2008 CNN poll 
found that 88% of Americans think the law should ban felons and those with 
mental illness from having guns.378 And Americans, even those in somewhat red 
states, believe that some places are inappropriate for guns: a 2011 poll of registered 
voters in Virginia, for example, found that voters overwhelmingly (75%–20%) 
oppose guns on college campuses and oppose by a nearly two-thirds majority 
allowing persons with permits to carry concealed firearms to bring their guns onto a 
college campus.379 
This modern view of the right to keep and bear arms is exactly the right we get 
in Heller. The most important part of Heller is its dicta on permissible government 
regulation of the right, which courts now use as precedent to decide Second 
Amendment challenges. With no analysis whatsoever, the Court declared: 
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today 
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.380 
Again without analysis, the Court reaffirmed these categories in McDonald v. 
Chicago.381 
The problem is that many of these “longstanding” laws have no historical 
constitutional basis. Federal law banned felons from possessing guns in 1968; that 
is not very “longstanding.”382 The closest nineteenth-century analogues I have 
found are laws prohibiting prisoners and vagrants from having guns.383  
This is not to say that the passage is completely inaccurate as a historical matter. 
Laws prohibiting guns in “sensitive places,” for example, have a much more 
longstanding history.384 As I explained above, the nineteenth-century courts upheld 
                                                                                                                 
 
 377. Hart/McInturff Study #6098, NBC/Wall St. J. Survey, Oct. 22–25, 2009, at 23, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/wsjnbc-10272009.pdf. Due to 
recent mass shootings, public opinion on this question may be in a state of flux. 
 378. CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, June 4–5, 2008, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm. 
 379. See Michael Sluss, Poll: Most in Virginia Oppose Guns on Campus, ROANOKE 
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2011), http://ww2.roanoke.com/politics/wb/302726/ (reporting a Quinnipiac 
University survey). 
 380. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 381. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (“We repeat those assurances 
here.”). 
 382. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see also Marshall, supra 
note 56. A 1961 amendment to the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 barred all felons (instead of 
merely individuals convicted of a violent felony) from receiving firearms in interstate 
commerce. The law did not bar possession, however. Id. at 698 (citing An Act to Strengthen 
the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961)). 
 383. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 384. The Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), prohibited guns in 
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prohibitions on carrying weapons into polling places, courthouses, and public 
gatherings.385 The usual concept was that such laws were permissible regulations of 
the right, provided they were not overbroad. The courts usually did not say that the 
conduct fell completely outside the scope of the right, but rather that the 
government could regulate a particular abuse of the right. 
  But the area where Heller completely divorces itself from history is its 
treatment of which weapons are constitutionally protected. Justice Scalia finds it 
startling to read Miller for the proposition that “ordinary military equipment” could 
mean that “only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.”386 Of course, this 
is exactly what Aymette, the authority cited in Miller, held: protected weapons were 
individual weapons of “civilized warfare.”387 In its place, the Court replaces this 
definition with the “common use” test: protected “arms” are those “typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”388 And why are handguns 
within the scope of the right? Because, Justice Scalia tells us, handguns are “the 
most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home 
and family.”389 Justice Breyer criticizes the new definition as circular—which it 
is—but then again, it is no more circular than “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”390 
The move to the “common use” test was undoubtedly a change—but not an 
unprecedented one. The Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Brown made a 
similar change to the right to bear arms.391 And in State v. Duke, the Texas 
Supreme Court protected both military weapons and those commonly possessed by 
law-abiding citizens, lest citizens find their everyday weapons without 
constitutional protection.392 Most importantly, this test solved Miller’s principal 
drawback of approving weapons considered inappropriate for civilian possession. 
Perhaps most extraordinary in formulating the new test is what happens to army 
rifles. In the nineteenth-century cases, the army rifle was at the very core of 
constitutional protection. Banning army rifles or muskets would have been to the 
Second Amendment what banning a particular mainstream political opinion would 
be to the First. Justice Scalia finds, in the common-law prohibition against carrying 
dangerous or unusual weapons, authority for banning “M-16 rifles and the like”—
the core ordinary, individual weapon of today’s infantry soldier.393 As Reva Siegel 
correctly argues: 
 In this remarkable passage, the majority imposes restrictions on the 
kinds of weapons protected by the Second Amendment that the 
                                                                                                                 
courthouses, marketplaces, and similar gatherings. 
 385. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 386. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008). 
 387. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 388. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 389. Id. at 628–29 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 
2007)); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (collecting 
quotations from Heller about the popularity of handguns for self-defense). 
 390. Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also O’Shea, supra note 285, at 
384. 
 391. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 393. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (majority opinion). 
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majority concedes would disable exercise of the right for the 
amendment’s textually enunciated purposes. How could an originalist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment exclude from its protection 
the kinds of weapons necessary to resist tyranny—the republican 
purpose the text of the Second Amendment discusses and, on the 
majority’s own account, “the purpose for which the right was 
codified”?394 
Siegel’s criticism is exactly right as a matter of originalism. Although Justice 
Scalia writes, “The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing 
arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense,”395 he has 
no authority for this proposition—likely because Justice Scalia has it backward.  
The tradition in England was that individuals would possess ordinary military 
weapons. This tradition dated at least from the Assize of Arms in 1181.396 When 
the Crown required people to have arms, the Assize of Arms selected weapons and 
body armor that were in common military use—not weapons that individuals 
happened to otherwise possess in their civilian lives for lawful purposes like self-
defense. In fact, individual self-defense against criminals was illegal in England at 
the time.397 The Assize of Arms listed weapons like chainmail, a helmet, a sword, 
and a shield—clearly military weapons, just like the muskets, pistols, and related 
military equipment prescribed by the Militia Act of 1792.398 I doubt seriously that 
twelfth-century Englishmen ordinarily kept chainmail, helmet, and a shield as part 
of their individual self-defense weapons in case a burglar broke into their home. 
The thought of someone trying to don all of this equipment in such an emergency is 
kind of ridiculous. Nor do I know of any evidence that ordinary citizens walked 
around in their helmets and chainmail in the usual course of their civilian lives. In 
fact, the common-law prohibition against carrying dangerous or unusual weapons 
may have originally punished exactly that: those who went out in public fully 
armed with their militia weapons and body armor in circumstances likely to 
provoke fear. 
Justice Scalia’s attempt to trace modern restrictions on military weapons to the 
common-law prohibition of going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons is 
unavailing. Although the crime is said to be a common-law offense, the Statute of 
Northampton implemented it and prescribed the punishment. That statute provided: 
That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except 
the King’s Servants in his presence, and his Ministers in executing of 
the King’s Precepts, or of their Office, and such as be in their Company 
assisting them, and also [upon a Cry made for Arms to keep the Peace, 
and the same in such places where such Acts happen,] be so hardy to 
come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Ministers doing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 394. Siegel, supra note 5, at 200. 
 395. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624. 
 396. Assize of Arms, 27 Hen. 2 (1181) (Eng.). 
 397. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 478 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press reprint 1968) 
(1895) (persons who killed in individual self-defense “deserve[d] but need[ed] a pardon”). 
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their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the 
peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, 
nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their 
Bodies to Prison at the King’s pleasure.399 
Despite the seemingly broad textual prohibition on carrying arms everywhere, 
courts construed the prohibition very narrowly—on the rare occasions that the 
statute was enforced. The common-law prohibition applied to carrying weapons in 
public. The Court of King’s Bench required that the carrier have the illegal purpose 
of terrifying citizens.400 This was the construction given to it in the United States by 
the North Carolina courts, the only courts that have seriously enforced the 
prohibition.401 The antebellum North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Huntly, 
stated that all guns are “dangerous or unusual weapons” for the purpose of this 
prohibition.402 Although gun ownership was common among Americans (and 
included guns of all kinds), the court argued that most individuals did not 
frequently carry those weapons. The crime was committed by carrying deadly 
weapons in public only if the person carrying the weapons had both the unlawful 
purpose of terrorizing others and if he carried the weapons “in such manner as 
naturally will terrify and alarm a peaceful people.”403 
Other authorities claim that the prohibition extended, beyond those with a 
specific intent to terrify, to those carrying weapons under circumstances that would 
provoke fear in reasonable people.404 William Hawkins distinguished between 
usual and unusual weapons. Because the public possession of common weapons 
does not cause fear in reasonable people, people are free to carry them for 
self-defense.405 In contrast, going armed with unusual weapons in ordinary 
circumstances will provoke fear in reasonable people, so carrying them is generally 
prohibited. This prohibition often included not just the carrying of certain weapons, 
but also walking the streets in armor.406 Nevertheless, no one violated the common-
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law prohibition by defending his home (or the home of another) against unlawful 
violence or by defending the state against invaders and domestic disturbances.407 In 
these circumstances, it is clear that the person carrying the weapons has no 
intention to breach the peace. 
Justice Scalia erred in using this common-law prohibition as a historical 
precedent to justify a total ban on “M-16 rifles and the like.” Today, the M16 rifle 
and its derivatives are at the very core of the contemporary soldier’s individual 
arms. Without these, no militia could be “well-regulated.”  
Justice Scalia might respond that England did occasionally ban specific weapons 
completely. Two statutes of Richard II, which further implemented the Statute of 
Northampton, did prohibit lancegays, a type of spear.408 Thus, there is some 
historical precedent for banning weapons completely, whether carried in public or 
not.  
I doubt, however, that these statutes will support Justice Scalia’s argument. The 
ban on lancegays was on a very specific type of weapon. The statute would be more 
analogous to a Prohibition-era legislature simply banning the Thompson 
submachine gun in light of the violence of organized crime. The ban on lancegays 
in no way deprived people of military arms generally, as does a complete ban on all 
military rifles.409  
Moreover, this particular ban did precede the creation of the right to have arms 
in the seventeenth century. By the time the right to have arms found its way into the 
English Bill of Rights, this particular weapon was obsolete, and so it is not clear if 
an analogous seventeenth-century ban would have been met with approval. Likely, 
a narrow ban on a very particular kind of weapon creating large public externalities 
would have been compatible with the right to have arms, whereas banning the 
entire class of military arms for civilian possession would not.  
By using the common-law rule to justify prohibitions against “M-16 rifles and 
the like,” Justice Scalia completely inverted the Second Amendment from its 
nineteenth-century understanding: army rifles to resist tyranny are out; handguns in 
the home for private purposes are in. How could an originalist interpretation of the 
Second Amendment exclude from its protection the kinds of weapons necessary to 
resist tyranny? An originalist interpretation cannot. Justice Scalia is not engaged in 
originalism; he is engaged in Ackermanian-style intergenerational synthesis.410  
Heller could have taken a different approach to the “machine gun problem.” 
Contemporaneous detractors of the nineteenth-century definition of “arms” 
objected to the “ordinary military equipment” test on the grounds that it might 
invalidate the general federal prohibition on “machineguns.”411 For them, 
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recognizing a general right of individuals to have automatic weapons was a 
reductio ad absurdum of recognizing an individual Second Amendment right to 
have arms that were useful for contemporary militia service.  
In response, the Court simply could have said that the ban on machine guns was 
a regulation—not a prohibition—of a core component of the right to keep and bear 
arms. Bans on handguns were impermissible because they eliminated “an entire 
class of arms.”412 The machine gun ban does not do this. Handguns, rifles, 
shotguns, and other firearms become, in legal terminology, “machineguns” when 
they are capable of shooting multiple shots with a single function of the trigger.413 
The machine gun ban did not ban an entire class of weapons: the handgun, rifle, 
and shotgun are still lawful. The ban just narrowly restricts the mode in which these 
particular guns fire, limiting them to one shot per pull of the trigger—just like 
prohibiting guns in a courtroom narrowly restricts the right to bear arms in public. 
But this approach, of course, would not have totally refashioned the right to bear 
arms in the right’s contemporaneous popular image—as a right to have arms 
primarily for personal self-defense—and that is what Justice Scalia was trying to 
do. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the right to keep and bear arms, courts have never been 
originalists. Subsequent generations remake the right to fit the popular conception 
of what the right ought to be. In the antebellum period, this meant expanding the 
right to include private self-defense and the right to carry guns openly for personal 
protection—while allowing state legislatures to enact concealed weapons laws in 
an effort to prevent crime and dueling. After the Civil War, courts curtailed the 
right to have guns in public; to justify this, they adopted a different theory of the 
right to bear arms, one that recognized its civic republican character and diminished 
the importance of individual self-defense. The courts thus altered their 
understanding of the purpose of the right to justify altering the dimensions of the 
right—dimensions that comported with the popular conceptions of the right’s scope 
and their demand for legislative solutions for the criminal use of weapons. Courts 
then applied the right against jurisdictions that adopted unusually severe laws for 
that time period. The content of the “regulation/prohibition” distinction that 
Winkler identifies is formed around contemporaneous notions of reasonableness. 
Heller is not an originalist decision, and it should not purport to be. Heller 
remade the Second Amendment around its current popular understanding. The rule 
in Miller—while almost certainly historically accurate—failed to allow courts to 
refashion the right in a manner palatable to the contemporaneous population. This 
is why Miller failed. Likewise, the collective rights cases failed because few people 
seriously understand the right to bear arms to protect nothing. 
The future of Heller remains uncertain. But I can say, with a fair amount of 
confidence, that how courts flesh out the right to bear arms tomorrow will strongly 
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resemble how the contemporaneous population understands the right—not what 
James Madison thought when he drafted the provision in 1789. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
